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This thesis contains three essays that analyses income inequality and poverty.
Chapter 1 examines the impact of education on income inequality in 18 Latin
American countries between 2000 and 2010. This period has raised interest in the
academic community because inequality has fallen across the region, after several years
of consistent high levels. Employing the novel technique proposed by Firpo et al.,
(2007) my research provides a detailed decomposition of inequality.
In Chapter 2 I examine and contrasts poverty and inequality measures using income
and consumption data from Mexico between 1994 and 2014. I investigate how poverty
and inequality measures have changed over time and compare results using income and
consumption based definitions. Using data from the Household Income and Expenditure
Surveys (ENIGH), I construct four measures of resources two income based and two
consumption based. The results suggest that income and consumption measures of
poverty can complement each other when evaluating certain policy programs.
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In Chapter 3 we analyze the changes in the gender structure at the top of the
income distribution in the United Kingdom over the last 19 years using administrative
data from tax records. Despite the fact that women have increased their participation
in the labour market over the past 20 years, they remained underrepresented at the
very top of the income distribution.
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Introduction
Inequality has been a hot topic over the last years due to the increasing accumulation of
income among the very rich (Alvaredo et al. (2018)). Historically, inequality in Latin
America has been particularly high but in recent years, has been declining. In the last
report from the World Inequality Database for Latin America, De Rosa et al. (2020)
find that despite falling trends in some countries, inequality is still very high and most
likely underestimated when using only survey data .
The main topics of this thesis are inequality and poverty. The first two Chapters
focus on inequality and poverty in Latin America where over the period between 2000
and 2010 inequality has been declining in most of the countries in the region. The
first Chapter analyses the effects of educational expansion on the declining levels of
inequality in 18 countries in Latin America. In the second Chapter, I focus on the case
of Mexico, where there is no agreement on the declining trend on income inequality. The
disagreement is due to the problems of miss-measurement when using income surveys,
specifically at the top of the income distribution. Researchers have shown that after
adjusting incomes at the top, income inequality is higher (see Campos-Vazquez and Lustig
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(2017)). However, to the best of my knowledge there is not yet evidence on how inequality
and poverty measures may be affected by possible miss-measurement at the bottom of
the income distribution. A growing literature in the US and the UK suggests income
at the bottom of the distribution is underestimated and that consumption provides a
more accurate measure of well-being (see Meyer and Sullivan (2003) and Brewer et al.
(2017)). The information that consumption can provide to improve measurements of
inequality and poverty has not been explored in Latin America, including Mexico. The
second Chapter analyses different measures of inequality and poverty using income and
consumption data to understand whether consumption measures of well-being provide
different results compare to those using income data for Mexico. Finally, the third chapter
of this thesis examines income inequality at the top of the income distribution. Using
administrative data, we characterize the gender gap among the top income groups in the
United Kingdom. This analysis has been motivated by the increasing evidence of under
reporting of income among top income groups using survey data (see Burkhauser et al.
(2018a)).
The theoretical links between education and income inequality have been extensively
debated(see Salverda et al. (2009)). However, the empirical evidence is less clear,
especially in less developed countries. Historically, Latin America has been
characterized by high inequality levels. However, between 2000 and 2010 inequality has
declined significantly throughout the region. At the same time, governments in the
region have been expanding education: education expanded on average by one year over
the same period. The first chapter investigates the links between educational expansion
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and changes in income inequality in 18 countries from 2000 to 2010, using RIF based
decomposition. I find that the expansion of education, keeping everything else constant
increased inequality in the region, confirming the presence of the Paradox of Progress.
However, once changes in returns to education are taken into account as well, the
expansion of education contributes to a reduction in inequality in some countries while
in others it increases inequality. The reason behind these heterogeneous effects of
education could lie in the shape of the returns to education which is country specific
and depends on educational policies implemented across different groups of the
population. The policy implication from this Chapter are that the educational policies
aiming to expand years of education should take into account the shape of the returns
to education if they do not want to increase inequality levels.
The decline in income inequality in the region has brought the attention of
researchers in Mexico to how well incomes at the top are measured in survey data and
what would happen if they were adjusted based on administrative sources of
information. However, to the best of my knowledge there is no comparable work looking
at income miss-measurement at the bottom of the income distribution and if and how
consumption data could be used to address it. The second chapter of this thesis uses
income and consumption information to construct four measures of living standards
(two income based and two consumption based) and compares inequality levels and
trends using these four measures. We find evidence that there is also under-reporting a
the bottom of the income distribution and that consumption data can complement the
4
information that income usually provides to measure inequality and poverty.
Finally, in the third chapter, motivated by the increase in income concentration
among the top income groups in the United Kingdom, we analyze gender differences
among the very rich. Very little is know about the gender gap among the top income
groups using administrative data. We find that the rising share of women in the top
income groups is driven by women with earned income and accompanied by an
increasing share of top income women being aged 45-54 and living in London at the
South East of England. The industries contributing the most to the rising female share
of income have been “Real estate, renting and business” and “Financial intermediation”.
Overall, we can conclude that policies that expand education in Latin America need
to consider the specific group of the population they are targeting and the additional
effects on inequality. Second, under-reporting of incomes in survey data is not an issue
that affects only the top but also the bottom of the income distribution in Mexico and
this could potentially be explained by the increase in informal jobs. The use of
consumption data can help to provide additional information about households that are
considered income and consumption poor. Finally, the availability of administrative
data to analyze the gender gap among top income groups provides more detailed
information on the characteristics of the industries and the women that remain under
represented. Earned income is a key source of income for women to reduce the gap with
respect to men. However, there is a concentration in specific industries and cities where
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women can improve their income. As a result, the reduction in the gender gap is not a
generalized phenomena across industries and cities in the UK.
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Chapter 1
The Impact of Education on Income
Inequality in Latin America between
2000 and 2010
1.1 Introduction
Inequality in Latin America has been a hot topic because of its high levels and its recent
homogeneous declining trend in the region.
The effects of the expansion of education on income inequality in Latin America
have been recently under discussion, due to the so called “Paradox of Progress” (by
Bourguignon et al. (2005)). This paradox is defined as the inequality-increasing effect of
the expansion of education (keeping the returns constant). The authors argue that two
mechanism are driving the phenomenon: the convexity of the returns to education, and
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the fact that income sources tend to be a convex function of years of schooling.
Therefore, if there is an increase in years of education we should expect an increase in
inequality. Bourguignon et al. (2005) show evidence of the inequality-increasing effect of
education in Argentina, Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Mexico. Applying the same
method, Battistón et al. (2014) finds that an increase in years of education increases
inequality in the region under the presence of convexity in the returns to education in
the labor market. The authors use data from 16 countries in Latin America over a
period covering the 1990s up to the 2000s. However, Cruces et al. (2014) concludes that
the expansion of education in the 2000s had an equalizing effect on earnings in 25 Latin
American countries; they point out the equalizing effect of education has reached a
turning point due to the gaps in the quality of education. A small number of studies
have focused on analyzing the presence of this paradox across the region over the period
of decreasing inequality. There is not yet conclusive evidence on the inequality
increasing effects of education. This paper contributes to fill this gap in the literature
on the effects of education on the decline in income inequality in Latin America.
My study contributes to a better understanding of the impact of education on the
homogeneous decline in income inequality for 18 countries in Latin America. In
particular this paper answer the following question: How has the expansion of
education contributed to the decline in income inequality in Latin America? In order to
answer this question, I implement the decomposition method proposed by Firpo et al.
(2007) (hereafter FFL method) using 36 harmonized household income surveys from 18
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Latin American countries1.
My results show that education has an inequality-decreasing effect in four countries
and an inequality-increasing effect in six countries. Further, the detailed decomposition
shows that the changes in the returns to education are the driving component of these
education effects, with changes in the returns to education reducing inequality in six
countries and increasing it in only three countries. On the other hand, changes in the
years of education ceteris paribus have an inequality-increasing effect in most of the
countries. This effect is consistent with the presence of the Paradox of Progress in the
region. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the literature
review. The methodology is described in Section 1.3, Section 1.4 is devoted to the data
description. Section 1.5 presents the results and Section 1.6 concludes.




There is strong consensus on the evidence about decreasing inequality levels in most of
the countries in Latin America over the last two decades2. A number of authors have
been recently analyzing the factors behind the inequality decline in the region, however
there is no consensus about the main determinants across countries. The following
literature review is organized as follows: First I will present the literature that
documents the link between education and inequality. Then, I will focus on the
determinants of the fall in income inequality divided by the type of methodology that it
is implemented: cross country analysis and decomposition techniques. The last
subsection is devoted to the literature that implements the FFL decomposition method.
1.2.1 The effects of education on inequality
The Paradox of Progress
From a standard supply and demand framework, I expect that an increase in the supply
of people with different education levels (keeping everything else constant) should reduce
the relative wages between those with more years of education and the ones with no
additional years. However, if the demand of people with more years of education increases,
the reduction of relative wages is not possible, in fact, the most important component of
disposable income in Latin America is labour income. Thus, the main channel through
2Gasparini et al. (2011a), Alvaredo and Gasparini (2013)
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which changes in education impact on the inequality of household disposable income
is their impact on earning and labour income, could increase. As a result, the wage
dispersion will be higher and income inequality would increase.
Recently, another group of authors have found that the convexity of the returns to
education could reverse the effects of education on inequality. Bourguignon et al. (2005)
show evidence of the inequality-increasing effect of educational expansion in Argentina,
Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Mexico; a phenomenon named by the authors as the
“Paradox of Progress”. Using a counterfactual microsimulation technique, the authors
simulate an increase in years of education, and find that this would increase inequality.
According to the authors the mechanism is the following: First, the returns to
education are a convex function of years of schooling. Second, the other incomes have to
be a convex function of years of education. Under these conditions, an increase in the
years of education will lead to an increase in inequality under the presence of increasing
returns to education.
Gasparini et al. (2005) argues that several forces driving in different directions
explained similar levels of inequality between 1986 and 1992 in Argentina, but the
returns to education had an inequality-decreasing effect. However, between 1992 and
1998 all the determinants contribute to the rise in inequality, especially the increase in
the returns to education. Bouillon et al. (2005) decompose the changes in income for
Mexico between 1984 and 1994, a period of increasing inequality in the country. The
authors find that changes in returns to education are the main component of the
23
increase in inequality, regardless of the expansion in years of education. The authors
argue that the positive effect of education on inequality is due to the increase in the
marginal returns to education.
Latter on, Battistón et al. (2014) using the same methodology as Bourguignon et al.
(2005) and the SEDLAC dataset for 13 Latin American countries, note that education
has an dis-equalizing effect between 1990s and 2000s. The authors suggest that this is
due to the convexity of the returns to education, which in the case of Latin America has
been related to the skill biased technological change. Gasparini et al. (2011c) analyze
the evolution of returns to skills for 16 Latin American countries. They show that
because of the increase in the supply of skilled workers, the returns to education
declined for the last two decades. However, they argue that there is a lot of
heterogeneity across countries.
On the other hand, Cruces et al. (2014) find that there is no correlation at the
country level between having higher inequality in the distribution of education, and
higher income inequality. The authors measure the impact of education inequality on
income distribution between 2000 and 2010 in Latin America. They conclude that the
expansion of education has not had a clear equalizing effect on income during the 1990s
due to the market-oriented reforms. However, during 2000s it has an equalizing impact
because of more pro-poor educational policies.
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Finally, Vélez et al. (2004) analyzes the case of Colombia on the period between
1978 to 1995, when inequality shows a ”U” shape. The authors identify two types of
factors affecting inequality trends. The first type are persistent factors such as the years
of education, the reduction in the size of the families, and the increase in female labor
force participation. The second group are fluctuating factors that include the returns to
education, sociodemographic characteristics and unobservable determinants. The
authors argue that the expansion of education has an dis-equalizing effect in urban
areas, while in rural areas, it has an equalizing effect.
Our conclusions from this literature review is that there is little consensus on the
effects of education on inequality and on the role of the returns to education, and
whether this role changed over time. The contribution of my paper is to study 18
countries in Latin America using harmonized micro-data, and to study the impact of
the expansion of education on the decline in inequality between 2000 and 2010. This
analysis will allow us to see if the Paradox of Progress is a pervasive phenomenon or not
among the countries in the sample. In the next subsection, I review an additional
channel through which education can effect income inequality: changes in household
structure.
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The effects of education on household structure
The expansion of education can impact household income through changes in the
household structure. Changes in fertility rates and assortative mating affect family
structure (see Andersen (2018)). According to Kim (2016), highly educated women
delay pregnancy due to their good position in their labor market. Therefore education
reduces their fertility and as a result per-capita disposable income within the household
increases, as well as inequality. Also, there is evidence that more educated women
prefer fewer children than less educated women. This preference increases the inequality
with respect to other households with women with low education. Another channel is
via assortative mating, when highly educated women marry highly educated men. If
education is positively correlated with income, an increase in education will lead ceteris
paribus to increased income inequality as differences between high and low educated
couples increase (see Greenwood et al. (2014) and Eika et al. (2019)).
Before continuing with the methodology, it is necessary to review the literature on
the determinants of the decline in income inequality in Latin America to understand the
context of the current discussion and the relevance of this study. The following review is
divided in to two groups of the literature, the first group does mainly a cross-country
review from other authors and the second group implements a decomposition method to
disentangle the determinants on income inequality in the region.
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1.2.2 The decline in income inequality in Latin America
Over the last three decades, there is a strong consensus that inequality levels in most of
the countries in Latin America have been receding3. However, there is yet no agreement
about the main driving factors of such improvement. Most of the cross-country studies
on income inequality tend to analyze the phenomenon by applying a decomposition
method, while a few others implement a regression analysis4. The following two
subsections include the review of works using a cross-country analysis and a
decomposition method to estimate the determinants of the decline in income inequality
in different countries in Latin America.
Cross-country analysis
Different explanations for the decline in income inequality have been proposed.
Alvaredo and Gasparini (2013) argue that several forces are behind the downward
trend. These include: improvement in macroeconomic conditions, higher employment
levels, the expansion of education and social spending, particularly monetary transfers.
However, they recognize that the empirical evidence about the main factors is still
scarce. Cornia (2012) uses data from 18 Latin American countries spanning from 1990
to 2009. His work applies a country-level regression analysis, where the Gini index of
the distribution of household disposable income per capita is the dependent variable
and as independent variables are terms of trade, the rate of growth of GDP per-capita,
3see for instance Gasparini et al. (2011a), Alvaredo and Gasparini (2013)
4see Cornia (2012)
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changes in exogenous factors such as the dependency rate and the activity rate, the
distribution of human capital among workers, fiscal policies proxies by the ratio of
direct to indirect taxes and public expenditure on social security/GDP, labor market
policies like minimum wage, and macroeconomic policy. The author concludes that the
causes of the decline of income inequality in the region were heterogeneous. The
reversal of the skill premium appears to have played a central role in improving the
distribution of income, but also the fiscal and labor market policies.
Lustig and Lopez-Calva (2013b) compile results from 11 countries. The authors
suggest that there were two main driving factors behind the decreasing inequality levels:
reduction in hourly labor income inequality and higher government transfers. According
to the authors, the fall in hourly labor income inequality was explained by the reduction
in the returns to education, either due to the increase in the supply of workers with
higher levels of education or a reduction in the demand of workers with higher skills. In
a similar fashion, Lustig and Lopez-Calva (2013a) analyze the cases of Argentina, Brazil
and Mexico. The authors examine the role of the demand and supply of labor skills;
institutional factors, such as minimum wages; unionization rates; and government
transfers. Their results show that both labor and non labor income inequality had
declined, and that there were two underlying phenomena in the three countries: the fall
in the premium to skill labor, and larger and more progressive government transfers.
The fall in the skill premium can be attributed to changes in the composition of
demand and supply of labor by skill, and institutional factors such as rising minimum
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wage and unionization. However, the relative strength of these factors varies
substantially by country.
Gasparini et al. (2011a) document the recent trend in income inequality in Latin
America and argue that there were several plausible factors behind the fall in inequality.
They highlight: employment growth, changes in relative prices, realignment after
reforms, cash transfer programs, and an increased in governments’ concern over high
and rising inequality levels.
López-Calva and Lustig (2010) argue that there were two main factors that drove
the inequality decline: a reduction in the earnings gap between skilled and low skilled
workers, and an increase in government transfers to the poor. They suggest that the
expansion of basic education might have contributed to the gap reduction. However,
there is a lot of controversy about the impact of the macroeconomic conditions and
policy reforms on the income distribution. This is because it is not easy to separate,
and measure the effects behind of such a complex variable like inequality.
Gasparini et al. (2011b) study the changes in wages using a supply and demand
framework between 1990s and 2000s to explain the fall of wage skill premium. They
find that can be partially attributed to the recent boom of commodity prices that could
favor the unskilled workers. However, there are other forces playing a role in the changes.
Lately, other authors such as Rodriguez-Castelan et al. (2016) have concentrated on the
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explanation of the decline in labor income inequality in Latin America. They show that
this decline is related with a reduction in college/primary education premium, the urban-
rural earnings gap, as well as in high school/primary education premium. They find that
there has been a decline in experience premium after 2002 in the region, that has been
contributing to the decline in the returns to education.
Most of the literature presented in this subsection focus on the determinants of the
decline in wage inequality in different countries while my research covers household
income for different countries in the region using one methodology to decompose the
effect of education.
Decomposition methods
This subsection reviews the works that use a decomposition technique in order to
disentangle the main components of the decline in inequality in Latin America. I will
pay special attention at the end of this subsection on to those works that are
implementing the FFL decomposition which in all the cases it has been applied to
specific countries in the region.
The following group of authors agree on the declines of the returns to characteristics
as one of the main driving factors of the decrease in income inequality. Azevedo et al.
(2013a) decompose inequality in labor income for 15 Latin American countries for the
years 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. They apply the decomposition method proposed by
30
Juhn et al. (1993a) using the Gini and Theil index as statistics of interest. The authors
attribute the decline of labor income inequality to a reduction in the returns to
education and experience. In a similar way, but extending the analysis to different parts
of the distribution, Azevedo et al. (2013b) use data from 14 Latin American countries
for the years 2000 and 2010 applying the decomposition technique proposed by Barros
et al. (2006) to determine the factors behind the decrease in earnings inequality. The
authors suggest that the reduction in inequality can be attributed to an increase in
earnings per-hour at the bottom of the income distribution. This decomposition
method builds on the idea of Juhn et al. (1993a), but instead of estimating a Mincer
model, they generate counterfactual distributions. This method belongs to the group of
decompositions that go beyond the mean, which constitute a relevant advantage over
other methods focusing on the mean. However, its main drawback is that it is not
possible to measure the contribution of each covariate to the structure and composition
effect. The heterogeneous results and the disadvantages of this decomposition methods
leave unanswered questions and gaps in the literature that a more detailed
decomposition technique such as the FFL method could answer.
The next group of authors implements the FFL decomposition method on a specific
country: Motivated by the fall in labor income inequality in Brazil between 1995 and
2012, Ferreira et al. (2014) decompose the mean and the Gini index of the differences in
earnings for the following periods 1995-2012, 1995-2003 and 2004-2012, and estimate
the effects of the covariates on the changes in the Gini index and the mean. The FFL
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decomposition method allows them to measure the size of the effect of four candidate
exploratory factors: human capital, labor market institutions, demographic composition
of the labor force, and spatial segmentation. They conclude that the fall in labour
income inequality between 1995 and 2012 was driven mainly by the distribution of
returns from the labor market rather than the composition effect. Also, the reduction in
gender, racial and urban-rural gaps contributed to reduce inequality.
Canavire-Bacarreza and Rios-Avila (2015) decompose the change in the labor income
distribution for Bolivia between 2000 and 2012. They find that the main driving forces
were: faster wage growth of low-paid jobs and wage stagnation of jobs that require
higher education. However, they argue that a large proportion of the decline remains
unexplained. Campos-Vázquez et al. (2014) analyze inequality trends for Mexico
between 1989 and 2010, examining the role of demand and supply of labour skills, as
well as institutional factors like minimum wages and unionization rate. They also
consider the effect of cash transfers in explaining changes in inequality. Using the FFL
method they decompose the changes in inequality of hourly wages and show that,
during the period between 1994 and 2006, most of the changes occurred at the bottom
of the income distribution, where the wages of low-skilled workers increased. Their
decomposition results also suggests that in the period from 2006 to 2010 the effect of
cash transfers contributed to the decline in income inequality. Recently Bussolo et al.
(2014) have shown that the fall in inequality is expecting to continue in the region due
to the decline in skill premia.
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The FFL decomposition method provides a deep analysis of the driving factors of
inequality. However, the authors have concentrated on specific countries. The potential
of the FFL decomposition can be extended to more countries and periods of time. I
applied the FFL method using household income surveys from 18 countries for the
period between 2000 and 2010, when inequality was in evident decline. The detailed
analysis that this decomposition provides, improves over the approach previously
presented in Azevedo et al. (2013b), because I estimate the effect of education on the
structure and composition components and not only the aggregate effect of these two
components. The work of Ferreira et al. (2014) provides a detailed analysis using the
FFL method only for the particular case of Brazil. My paper extends the analysis for 18
countries to compare the determinants behind the apparent homogeneous declining
pattern of inequality in the region.
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1.3 Methodology
In this section, I set out the decomposition method I use. This was first developed by
Firpo et al. (2007) and it is usually called ”the FFL method”’. The FFL method is a
generalization of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Blinder (1973a) and Oaxaca
(1973a)) and is intended to decompose summary statistics of an outcome variable than
the mean. The approach belongs to the group of “distributional methods” according to
the classification provided by Fortin et al. (2011a), and to the class of tools that allow
for detailed decomposition. Distributional methods are characterized as those
decomposition techniques that can decompose statistics other than the mean (such as
the variance, Gini and quantiles). A detailed decomposition method is one that
subdivide the structure and composition effect into the contribution of each covariate to
the two effects. The main advantage of getting detailed information from the
distribution is that it provides guidelines for policy recommendations that less detailed
decomposition methods cannot have.
Within the group of distributional methods of decomposition there are other three
types of decompositions similar to the FFL. The first one proposed by Juhn et al.
(1993b), the second one by Machado and Mata (2005a) is based on counterfactual
distributions. The JMPs decomposition is based on a residual imputation while the
method by Machado and Mata (2005a) is a conditional quantile regression method. The
third method was proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996), this method consist of using a
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reweighting factor to estimate the structure component.
The residual imputation approach by Juhn et al. (1993b) is based on the strong
assumption that residuals are independent of the covariates according to Fortin et al.
(2011b). Also, this method does not allow to have a detail decomposition of the
composition effects. This means we can not separate the contribution of each covariate
into the composition effect.
The decomposition method proposed my Machado and Mata (2005b) originally have
the same drawback, which is that is not possible to estimate a detailed decomposition of
the composition effect. However, the authors suggest an unconditional reweighting
approach to decompose the composition effect. Nonetheless, according to Fortin et al.
(2011a) this approach does not provide a consistent effect.
Finally, the reweighting method by Juhn et al. (1993b) has the advantage of not being
path dependent. However, it includes an interaction term that can be difficult to
interpret.
The FFL method base on the RIF-regression is an straightforward extension of the
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition proposed by Oaxaca (1973b) and Blinder (1973b). This
decomposition has the advantage of being path independent easy to interpret. Its main
limitation is that it is not possible to have general equilibrium effects.
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1.3.1 The FFL method
The FFL method is a two stage procedure: The first step is the estimation of a
counterfactual distribution; this allows the total change in the statistic of interest to be
split between the structure and composition effects. The second step involves the
estimation of the contribution of each covariate to the structure and composition effects
using the RIF-regression. The overall aim is to estimate the contribution of a set of
covariates, X to the overall difference ∆τO in some distributional statistic τ between two
groups. In our application we take quantiles as the statistic of interest and the groups
are time periods.
First Step: The estimation of weights to separate the structure and
composition effect.
The first step in the methodology involves estimating three sets of weights. Following
Firpo et al. (2007), suppose we have a random sample of N = N1 +N0 individuals, where
N1 and N0 are the number of individuals in each group, where i = 1, . . . , N are the
individuals. The probability that an individual i is in group 1 given a set of covariates
X = x is p(x) = Pr[T = 1|X = x] called the “propensity score”, where Ti = 1 if
individual i is observed in group 1, and Ti = 0 if individual i is observed in group 0.




; ω0(T ) ≡
1− T











The first two functions (ω1(T ) and ω0(T )) transform features of the marginal
distribution of Y into features of the conditional distribution of Y1 given T = 1
(conditional distribution of time one, given that households belong to time 1) and of Y0
given T = 0 (conditional distribution of time zero, given that households belong to time
0). The third re-weighting function (ωC(T,X)) transforms features of the marginal
distribution of Y into features of the counterfactual distribution of Y0 given T = 1.
The counterfactual distribution cannot be directly identified, but the FFL shows
that it is possible to estimate the counterfactual income distribution under the
assumptions of ignorability and overlapping support. The ignorability assumption
states that the distribution of the unobserved characteristics is the same across groups 1
and 0, once we condition on a vector of observed characteristics. The overlapping
support ensures that no single observable or unobservable characteristic can identify the
membership into one of the groups or periods of time. In our application this means
that, if the ignorability and overlapping support conditions hold, then we can estimate
a counterfactual income distribution that would be observed if households living in
period t0 had experienced the income structure observed in period t1.
In practice, we can estimate p(x) using a probit model, and having done this we can
estimate the weights functions. With the estimated weights we can calculate the overall
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decomposition:
∆τO = (τ1 − τ̂C) + (τ̂C − τ0) = ∆τS + ∆τX (1.1)
We can define the terms similar in spirit to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition where
∆τO is the overall income gap measured in terms of the distributional statistic τ , which
for our case is quantile. The first term is the structure effect ∆τS and the second term
the composition effect ∆τX , τ1, τ0 and τ̂C are the τ distributional statistics corresponding
to the observed income distribution in time t = 1, t = 0, and with t = C the estimated
statistic from the counterfactual income distribution.
Second Step: Estimation of the Recentered Influence Function (RIF)
The second step is using OLS to estimate the linear projection of the recentered
influence function (RIF) regression. This is known as the RIF regression and it is
identical to standard OLS, except that the dependent variable is the recentered
influence function of the statistic of interest.
The influence function of a quantile5 is defined as: IF (y; qτ ) = τ−1{y≤qτ}fY (qτ ) . The
Recentered Influence Function (RIF) of the quantile τ th is
RIF (y; qτ ) = qτ + IF (y; qτ ) = qτ + (τ − 1 {y ≤ qτ} /fY (qτ )).
The linear approximation for the conditional expectation of the RIF is:
5τ − th quantile of the distribution F is defined as Q(F, τ) = inf {y|F (y) ≥ τ}
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E [RIF (Y, τ) |X] = X ′β (1.2)




















ω̂C (Ti, Xi)Xi ˆRIF (Yi; νC) (1.4)
where ω̂C (Xi,0) is the estimated weight from the first step.
With these estimated parameters we can express the overall structure and
composition effects for any quantile τ as follows.





∆̂τX = (E [X|T = 0]) · β̂τ0 + R̂τ (1.6)




is an approximation error due to the fact that
the FFL decomposition is based on the first order approximation to the composition
effect.
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Crucially this allows us to estimate the contribution of each covariate to each of the
structure and composition effect. For example, the contribution of education to the




+ ∆TXedu , where (1.7)







∆̂τXedu = (E [Xedu|T = 0]) · β̂
τ
edu + R̂τ (1.9)
1.3.2 Inference
The FFL decomposition method requires several steps, and this complicates statistical
inference. Therefore, I implement a paired bootstrap sampling method in order to
estimate confidence intervals. From the observed sample of each year and country, I
obtained B = 300 bootstrap samples in order to estimate a set of parameters.
From the set of parameters θ̂∗1 . . . θ̂∗B obtained from the B bootstrap replications I
calculate the bootstrap confidence interval of θ̂ using the percentile method6.
6The percentile method establish the confidence intervals directly from the bootstrap distribution of
the parameters. Once the values of θ̂∗B are in ascending order, the confidence interval is the distance
between the lower α/2 and the upper α/2
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1.4 Data
The data used in this study are part of the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America
and the Caribbean (SEDLAC). I use 36 harmonized cross-section household surveys
from 18 countries. The surveys of Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela are representative
at urban level while the other 15 countries are representative at the national level. To
make periods comparable across time, I use circa criteria for the years 2000 and 2010.
Table 1.1 provides more details of the countries, years and surveys included in this
research.
My interest is in the change in the distribution of household income. More precisely,
I use per capita household income, defined as disposable income (net market income7,
plus cash transfers8) divided by the number of persons in the household,. I do not use a
different equivalence scale because most of the relate literature in Latin America use per
capita income (see Bourguignon et al. (2005), Gasparini et al. (2005), Battistón et al.
(2014), Cruces et al. (2014), Vélez et al. (2004), Lustig and Lopez-Calva (2013b),
Gasparini et al. (2011a), López-Calva and Lustig (2010) and Gasparini et al. (2011b) ).
Therefore, to have comparable results with the rest of the literature I use per capita
income.
I use household income because it better reflects the well-being of the family
7Labor market income, capital income excluding social contributions and taxes.
8Social insurance, assisted program, etc.
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members. Also, the expansion of education can impact household income through the
changes in the structure of the households not just via the labor market, see the review
in section 1.2.1. Labor income constitutes the largest component of total household
income in Latina America, and so I expect results for household income to be similar to
those obtained using earnings only.
The covariates can be organized in three groups: socio-demographic, labor market
and education. Socio-demographic variables are: urban(dummy), household
size(continuous), age(continuous) and gender(dummy). Labor market has one dummy
variable that identifies if the head of the household works. The education variable is
years of education of the head of the household (continuous). The use of variables from
the head of the household is justified by the relevance of the family background (see
section 1.2.1) on differences in income at different stages in life. Therefore the head of
the household characteristics are a good approximation and control variables for the
family background.
Table 1.2 has the descriptive statistics per country. Total per-capita income increased
from 2000 to 2010, only two countries experience a decline: El Salvador and Venezuela
with a decrease in income of 1.9 and 4.2 log points, respectively. On the other hand
countries like Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador experience an increase in income of two
times the average over the same period: 2.3, 1.6 and 1.3 log points, respectively. Years
of education increase by one year on average. In terms of labour market participation,
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there was a reduction in 13 countries out of 18: Argentina, Panama, Peru, El Salvador
and Uruguay experienced an increase. The three sociodemographic variables such as the
household size, average age of the head of the household and the percentage of females as
heads of the household, present the following changes: The average reduction in household
size was very small. It went from 4.3 members in 2000 to 3.8 in 2010. The average age of
the head of the household increased by 2 years. The proportion of females heads of the
household increased by 6.2 percentage points.
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1.5 Results
I present in this section my findings on the contribution of the expansion of education
on the decline in income inequality. First, I start with the analysis of the re-centered
influence function regression results in order to see the heterogeneous effect of education
across the income distribution. Later, I will focus on the decomposition results to
disentangle the total impact of education into structure and composition effect across
income quantiles.
1.5.1 RIF Regressions
Before presenting the decomposition results, I analyze the results from the re-centered
influence function regression for the variable of education. From equation 1.2, I estimate
IF (yi; qτ ) for the education variable. The estimates for the nine quantiles are reported
in Figures 1.1 and 1.29. We see a positive effect of education across the income
distribution in both years 2000 and 2010. This implies that years of education have an
inequality-increasing effect. As we move up in to the distribution, education increases
its returns for household at the top quantiles. But, if we look at the change in
household income between 2000 and 2010; the effect of education drops from 2000 to
2010 in most of the countries while in others such as Ecuador and Mexico it increases
between 2000 and 2010. Nonetheless, those effects are not equally distributed along the
9The RIF regression coefficients for the rest of the variables are reported from Figure 1.18 to Figure
1.20
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quantiles. For example, Nicaragua, Peru and Paraguay the drop was mainly at the top
of the income distribution. El Salvador for instance, shows a fall in the bottom half of
the income distribution. More importantly, the results indicate that education has
differentiated effects on inequality in the region. For example, in Peru the reduction of
the effects of education between 2000 and 2010 is bigger at the top end of the
distribution, which contributes to the fall in inequality. The opposite situation is
present in Costa Rica, where the effects of education across the distribution increases
between 2000 and 2010 at the top end of the income distribution while decreases at the
bottom, this contributes to an increase in inequality.
1.5.2 Empirical Findings on the Aggregate Decomposition of
Income Inequality
Figure 1.3 shows the total change in inequality (∆τ0), measured by the natural
logarithm of the 90-10 ratio, between 2000 and 2010. Almost all of the 18 countries
experienced a fall in inequality (in Colombia the change is not statistically significant).
Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Peru and El Salvador are among the countries that
experience the biggest fall in inequality. Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico and Uruguay
experience a modest decline.
Figure 1.4 shows the decomposition of the log 90-10 ratio into the structure and
composition effect. This is based on the equation (1.1). To estimate the reweighting
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factor ŵC(Ti, Xi), I use the set of covariates described in Section 4. For the
decomposition estimation I use the same set of covariates. The decline in inequality for
all of the countries has been driven by the structure effect (see Figure 1.5 and Table
1.16). On the other hand, the composition effect has a smaller contribution to the total
change but increases inequality in 11 countries (see Figure 1.6).
1.5.3 Empirical Findings on the Education Effects on Income
Inequality
The next step in the decomposition shows the total effect (structure and composition
effect) of education on inequality, based on equations 1.7 and 1.9. Figure 1.7 shows that
there are heterogeneous effects across countries. However, it is possible to divide the
effects in to two groups. For the first group of countries, education has an inequality
increasing effect: Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, El Salvador and Uruguay.
The second group is composed of four countries, where education has an inequality
reducing effect: Chile, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Peru.
Figure 1.8 divides the total effect of education on inequality into structure and
composition effect. It is clear how some of the countries in the region are divided by the
sign of the effect, specially the structure effect or the changes in the returns to
education. The total effect (dot bars) of education is driven by the structure effect that
contributes to the reduction of inequality for six countries in the sample. Not
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surprisingly perhaps, the composition effect (dash bars) increases inequality in 14
countries.
Figure 1.9 and Figure 1.10 show the two effects with their respective confidence
intervals. The composition effect (see Figure 1.9) increases inequality for most of the
countries except in Dominican Republic, Argentina and El Salvador where the effect is
not statistically significant. On the other hand, in Figure 1.10 the structure effect shows
a different pattern. For six countries the structure effect contributes to the reduction in
inequality, while in only three countries increases inequality (see also Table 1.17).
1.5.4 Discussion
The decomposition analysis of education shows that the changes in education have
shaped the inequality levels in different directions in the region. These differentiated
effects of education on the decline of income inequality allow us to identify in the
2000-2010 period two groups of countries: for one group, education has an inequality
decreasing effect and in the second one education has an inequality increasing effect.
Further, we find that the main component of the total effect of education is the
structure effect rather than the composition component, where the latter has a positive
effect for most of the countries.
The decomposition analysis presented in this work disentangles two relevant
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components of the changes in education an their effects on income inequality. Most of
the countries in Latin America have experienced an expansion of basic education over
the last decade, among other policies targeting the educational sector. The results just
presented in my work show that if we only consider the impact of the increased level of
education (or the composition effect; see Figure 1.9) then we would conclude that
education expansion increases inequality in all countries in the region. However, the
structure effect which captures changes in the returns to education is playing a
significant role within the total effect of education on inequality. Indeed, the structure
effect plays such a significant role that in some countries it more than compensates the
composition effect (see Figure 1.8), and in these countries the total effect of educational
expansion is inequality-decreasing: Chile, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Peru.
My results are consistent with Ferreira et al. (2014) for the case of Brazil, where the
authors find that the total effect of human capital reduces inequality in the period
between 1995 to 2012. This study finds that the structure effect of human capital has
an inequality decreasing effect, while the composition effect increases inequality. Also,
for the case of Mexico my results are consistent with Campos-Vázquez et al. (2014).
They show evidence of the paradox of progress in Mexico using the FFL method by
decomposing the change in wages into structure and composition effect between 1998
and 2010. We find that the total effect of education is inequality increasing. The
detailed analysis of the structure and composition effect shows that only the
composition effect has a significant and inequality increasing effect. Finally, the work by
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Battistón et al. (2014) where they analyze the effect of the expansion of education in 13
Latin American countries, they find that education increases inequality in the region
between the 1990s and 2000s. However, they do not highlight the fact the changes in
returns to education are the main component on the effects of inequality rather than
the expansion of education considered alone. The changes in the returns compensate in
some cases the increasing effects of the expansion of the years of education as it is the
case of Chile, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Peru where the total effect of
education is inequality decreasing.
My decomposition analysis shows that the Paradox of Progress is present in 14 out
of 18 countries in the sample, because changes in the distribution of years of education
have an inequality increasing effect (keeping the returns constant). However, the
expansion of years of education is not the only way that education affect inequality. The
structure effect, or the returns to education, is actually the main component of the total
effect of education. The effect of the decline in the returns to education at the top half
of the income distribution goes in the opposite direction, contributing to the reduction
in inequality in six out of 18 countries . As a result, the total effect of education is
inequality increasing in six countries and inequality decreasing in four countries.
49
The expansion of education
Figure 1.11 shows the average change in years of education in the 18 countries between
2000 and 2010. Years of education increase by one year, on average, across countries.
The expansion of education across the income distribution benefited more the
households at the bottom half of the income distribution in most of the countries (see
graphs 1.12 and 1.13). For instance, in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Chile the increase
in years of education was mainly at the bottom half of the income distribution, while
the top quantile does not experience a significant increase in years of education compare
with the bottom quantiles. Dominican Republic and Honduras present a different
pattern. The top half of the distribution experience a decline in years of education,
while the bottom half increases between 2000 and 2010. Other countries observe an
apparent homogeneous increase in years of education. For example Mexico and Costa
Rica, where the increase in years of education is similar across the income distribution.
The correlation between the estimated effect of education on inequality and the
observed expansion in years of education is shown in Figure 1.14. The correlation
between this two variables is slightly negative, which means that positive changes in
years of education are associated with the negative effects of educational expansion on
inequality. Previously, we saw that the total effect of education was heterogeneous on
inequality. Some of the countries experience a positive effect while other a reduction in
inequality. Therefore, the weak correlation between the change in years of education
and the estimated effect of education is consistent due to the contradictory forces
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pushing inequality up and down. In addition to that, this correlations are in line with
Bourguignon et al. (2005)’s argument about the expansion of education and the
inequality levels. They said that regardless of the distribution of years of education
their effects on inequality will vary depending on the mechanisms of transmission from
education to income in each country.
Figure 1.15 shows the correlation between the estimated impact of education on
inequality and the changes in the estimated returns to education. The graph shows a
negative correlation between the two variables. This implies that bigger reductions in
returns to education at the top quantiles with respect to the bottom are correlated with
the inequality decreasing effect of education. This strong correlation is consistent with
our results due to the inequality decreasing effect of the structure component.
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1.6 Conclusions
I estimate the effects of education on income inequality in 18 Latin American countries.
Using standardized household income surveys from 2000 to 2010, and applying the FFL
decomposition method I decompose the change in income inequality into structure and
composition effects across the income distribution. I focus on the impact of education
on income inequality: I find that education decreases inequality in Chile, Dominican
Republic, Nicaragua and Peru, while for Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, El
Salvador and Uruguay, it increases inequality. In addition to that, if we consider only
the impact of changes in the distribution of years of education (keeping the returns
constant), their effect on inequality in all the countries has been increasing, a finding
that is consistent with the so called “Paradox of Progress”.
I further show that the returns to education decline between 2000 and 2010,
specially a the top end of the income distribution for most of the countries. The
association between the fall in the returns to education and the estimated effects on
inequality is significant and negative. This imply that the inequality-decreasing effect of
education is correlated with the reduction in the returns to education at the top of the
income distribution, relative to the bottom.
All in all, the results suggest that the paradox of progress is a generalized
phenomena in Latin America. However, the structure effect also plays a significant role
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in the effects of education on inequality. The countries where the total effect of
education is inequality-decreasing experience an inequality-increasing effect from the
changes in years of education, but at the same time an inequality-decreasing effect from
the changes in their returns. The changes in the returns to education more than
compensate the inequality-increasing effect or phenomenon of the “Paradox of
Progress”. As a result, the total effect of education contributes to the reduction in
income inequality in Chile, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Peru.
Therefore, policies that consider the expansion of education have to take into
account their distributional effects. The changes in returns to education play an
important role in the effects of education on inequality levels, as well as the particular
circumstances of each country.
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Source: Author’s calculation based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World
Bank)homogenized household income surveys.
Figure 1.1: Unconditional Quantile Regression: Education cont.
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Source: Author’s calculation based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World
Bank)homogenized household income surveys.
Figure 1.2: Unconditional Quantile Regression: Education
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Notes: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals with 300 replications.
Source: Author’s calculation based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World
Bank)homogenized household income surveys.
Figure 1.3: Total change in inequality
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Source: Author’s calculation based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World
Bank)homogenized household income surveys.
Figure 1.4: Structure effect and Composition effect
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Notes: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals with 300 replications.
Source: Author’s calculation based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World
Bank)homogenized household income surveys.
Figure 1.5: Structure Effect
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Notes: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals with 300 replications.
Source: Author’s calculation based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World
Bank)homogenized household income surveys.
Figure 1.6: Composition Effect
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Notes: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals with 300 replications.
Source: Author’s calculation based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World
Bank)homogenized household income surveys.
Figure 1.7: Total effect of education on inequality
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Source: Author’s calculation based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World
Bank)homogenized household income surveys.
Figure 1.8: Education: structure and composition effect
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Notes: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals with 300 replications.
Source: Author’s calculation based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World
Bank)homogenized household income surveys.
Figure 1.9: Education: Composition Effect
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Notes: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals with 300 replications.
Source: Author’s calculation based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World
Bank)homogenized household income surveys.
Figure 1.10: Education: Structure Effect
69
Source: Author’s calculation based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World
Bank)homogenized household income surveys.
Figure 1.11: Average Change in Years of Education
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Source: Author’s calculation based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World
Bank)homogenized household income surveys.
Figure 1.12: Distribution of years of Education 2000 vs 2010 cont.
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Source: Author’s calculation based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World
Bank)homogenized household income surveys.
Figure 1.13: Distribution of years of Education 2000 vs 2010
72
Source: Author’s calculation based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World
Bank)homogenized household income surveys.
Figure 1.14: Education effect on inequality vs changes in years of education
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Source: Author’s calculation based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World
Bank)homogenized household income surveys.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.16: Aggregate Decomposition Results
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Figure 1.17: Education Effects on Inequality
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Figure 1.18: Decomposition Results cont.
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Figure 1.19: Decomposition Results cont.
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Figure 1.20: Decomposition Results
Chapter 2
Measuring Inequality and Poverty
with Income and Consumption in
Mexico, 1994 - 2014
2.1 Introduction
The use of income or consumption data to measure living standards has been under
debate in the recent literature. This is due to the different trends obtained when
measuring poverty and inequality and their implications in terms of policies. Some
authors argue that consumption is preferable over income based on two arguments.
First, consumption is a better measure of long-term living standards due to the
presence of smoothing using savings, credit or borrowing to offset temporary income
shocks. Second, consumption appears to be a better measure of well-being for people at
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the bottom of the distribution because it tends to be less vulnerable to under-reporting
than income.
In Mexico however, very little is known about the information that consumption data
can provide about household well-being. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature.
I estimate inequality and poverty measures using spending and consumption data, and
compare them with the traditional measures based on income. In addition, I contrast the
changes in the distribution at three points in time covering two decades: 1994, 2002 and
2014 . This period has been characterized by high levels of income inequality during the
1990s and falling inequality after the 2000s. Specifically, I ask the following questions: Are
consumption- or spending-based measures of inequality and poverty similar to income-
based measures? How different are households identified as income-poor to those that
are consumption-poor?
To answer the first question, I start with standard measures of inequality and
poverty in 1994, 2002 and 2014 using four definitions: cash income, broad income,
spending and consumption. Then, I contrast the changes along the distribution using
growth incidence curves (GIC). To look at poverty, I analyze the extent of the overlap
between households identified as income-poor and those identified as consumption-poor,
and I examine correlations between different socio-demographic characteristics and the
probability of being income-poor or consumption-poor. In this work, I define poverty as
the households in the bottom twenty percent of the income or consumption distribution.
In this way, my measures are comparable to official income-based measures of poverty.
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The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2, I describe the
economic context and the inequality and poverty trends in Mexico between 1994 and
2014. Section 2.3 presents the literature review for other countries and Mexico using
income and consumption measures of inequality and poverty. Section 2.4 describes the
data and the construction of income and consumption definitions to measure poverty
and inequality. In section 2.5, I present the results. Conclusions are presented in section
2.6.
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2.2 The Economic Context in Mexico
To help the interpretation of the results, this section provides background information
about economic, poverty and inequality trends in Mexico.
The period of analysis is 1994 to 2014. At the start of this period, Mexico experienced
an economic crisis. Cunningham and Maloney (2000) estimate that household income fell
30 percent and the crisis affected households at the top of the income distribution more.
In 2002, the economy slowly started to recover, until the economic crisis in the US hit
Mexican growth rates in 2009. Since 2009, the economy has slowly recovered. In 2009,
economic growth was -5.3 percent. Later on, between 2010 and 2014 economic growth
averaged 3.3 percent per year (see Figure 2.1).
2.2.1 Poverty in Mexico
Poverty has been extensively documented in Mexico during this period, with the
Consejo Nacional de Evaluacion de la Politica de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL)
reporting the official measures of poverty. The first official measure of poverty was
published by the government in 2002 and has been used since by CONEVAL. Poverty is
measured at the national and the state level. The main source of information is the
Socioeconomic Conditions Module of the National Survey of Household Income and
Expenditure (MCS-ENIGH, Modulo de Condiciones Socioeconomicas de la Encuesta
Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares), a household survey carried out every two
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years starting with 2008 by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI,
Instituto Nacional de Geografia y Estadistica). Between 2002 and 2006 the official
measure of poverty was based only on income. From 2008, CONEVAL published a new
multidimensional poverty measure. This new measure considers income and six other
dimensions: education lag, access to health services, access to social security, access to
food, housing quality and space, access to basic housing services and degree of social
cohesion.
CONEVAL has three poverty lines based on income. The first one is calculated as
the income needed to afford a basic food basket. The second one considers the basic
food basket and other services such as health and education. The third poverty line
adds to the previous one other services such as housing, transportation and clothes. I
will be referring to the first official poverty line only to compare the results in this work.
The first official poverty measures indicates that poverty fell slightly between 1994 and
2014. During this period poverty fell 0.6 percentage points from 21.2 percent in 1994 to
20.6 in 2014. The fall was a bit larger between 1994 and 2002: 1.2 percentage points1.
2.2.2 Income inequality in Mexico
Between 1994 and 2014 income inequality declined (see Figure 2.2). In 1994, the Gini
index was 0.53; later, in 2014, it fell to 0.492. According to Székely (2005), in the first
1see https://coneval.org.mx/Medicion/EDP/Paginas/Datos-censales.aspx
2Socio-Economic Database for Latin American and the Caribean (SEDLAS).
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part of this period, inequality was very high. Then, between 1994 and 1996, inequality
fell due to a general fall in living standards at all income levels during the crisis. After
1996 and before 2004, inequality remained very high because of an expansion of the
high income and middle classes. Over the 2000s, inequality has been declining.
However, there is a debate about the determinants of the observed declined in Mexico.
Cortés (2017) argues that despite inequality falling after 2002, it is not possible to
identify structural changes. Social policies, and in particular the Progresa/
Oportunidades program that targets the poorest households in rural areas were not
enough to significantly alter inequality trends. While the program helped reduce
inequality among the poor, it could not reach all households at the very end of the
income distribution. The author emphasizes that the income share of the households in
the bottom percentile has remained the same between 2002 to 2014.
The debate on the decline of income inequality has extended to questioning the
quality of the data and specifically the data coming from very rich households.
Campos-Vazquez and Lustig (2017) show that after imputing values for households at
the top of the income distribution, inequality did not decline between 2006 and 2017.
Also Cortés (2013) argues that there is not enough evidence to say that inequality has
been declining since 2002. Even, when the income measures used are similar, there is no
agreement about trends in inequality in Mexico.
In addition, researchers have compared measures of income from National Accounts
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to those provided by the household income surveys, such as ENIGH. Bustos (2015)
argues there are two main issues with ENIGH: under-reporting of income by
households, and a truncation effect due to the exclusion of households with very high
incomes. He proposes a statistical adjustment to the distribution of income in ENIGH
to make it compatible with information from National Accounts. After the adjustment,
he finds that the official poverty measure does not change much, but inequality
increases enormously. He estimates a Gini value of 0.803 in 2012 instead of 0.44 without
the adjustment.
Del Castillo (2015) propose a framework to adjust for under-reported income in
order to provide better measures of income inequality. They suggest to estimate
inequality after adjusting incomes at the top of the distribution. They also find that
this adjustment increases inequality substantially. The income share owned by the top
ten percent of the distribution increases by from 35% to 65%, so the Gini coefficient
goes from 0.45 to 0.68.
Similarly, Del Castillo Negrete (2015) and Esquivel (2015) show how inequality
changes when they adjust and incorporate incomes from the very rich households. After
that, several works have shown various methodologies to adjust the differences Cortés
and Vargas (2017), Campos Vázquez and Rodas Milian (2019) and Santaella and Leyva
(2017). In general they show that inequality is higher when considering missing incomes
at the top from survey data.
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Since this work focuses on the differences in using income and consumption
definitions, I use only data from ENIGH. I am not adjusting the top incomes using any
other source of information as the latest literature has done.
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2.3 Measuring Living Standards: Income vs
Consumption
2.3.1 Income vs Consumption
Traditionally, measures of inequality and poverty around the world have been
constructed using income data. As a result most of the efforts haven been concentrated
on improving the collection of income data. On the other hand, economic theory
suggests consumption might be a better measure of life-time resources than current
income. At least two economic theories, the permanent income hypothesis by Friedman
(1957) and life-cycle models by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) suggest consumption
better captures the life time resources of households. Both theories assume that
individuals can borrow or use savings when they experience temporary income shocks
to preserve their consumption level. As a result, consumption will vary less over time
compared to income. The advantage of consumption compare to income as a measure of
living standards has been documented by Poterba (1989), Cutler and Katz (1992) and
Slesnick (1993). If we assume all the population has the option to smooth consumption
with savings and/or can access credit markets, consumption data should reflect better
long term living standards.
A growing literature has pointed out the possibility of miss-measurement of income
at the bottom of the distribution and the advantages of using consumption data over
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income to measure poverty. The work by Meyer and Sullivan (2009) suggest that
consumption not only better reflects the long-term resources of a family , but it also
captures the effects of savings and dis-saving, the ownership of durable goods and access
to credit in the US. They conclude that a consumption based poverty measure would
capture better changes in well-being and the effects of anti-poverty government policies.
Meyer and Sullivan (2011) and Meyer and Sullivan (2003) show for the US that
consumption data captures better the well-being of the poor compared to measures
based on income. They highlight the fact that expenditure exceeds income among the
poor, suggesting a problem of income under-reporting. Brewer and O’Dea (2012) and
Brewer et al. (2017) show that, in the UK households with the lowest incomes spend
more on average than households located at higher quantiles of the income distribution.
They conclude that this mismatch is likely due to under-reporting of income at the
bottom rather than the over-reporting of expenditure or consumption smoothing.
Finally, they document that low consumption is better correlated with other measures
of living standards than low income.
Evidence from Greece by Kaplanoglou and Rapanos (2018) suggest that the use of
consumption data is preferable to income data due to do the extreme under-reporting of
income in the household surveys.
On the other hand, consumption may also suffer from specific shortcomings as a
measure of living standardsBlundell and Preston (1995) suggest that consumption habits
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strongly depend on the life cycle stage. Intertemporal smoothing assumptions at the heart
of permanent income and life cycle models, might not hold Therefore, consumption data
might not reflect long term resources. For the case of Mexico, the literature has shown
that it is not clear that individuals and household population can smooth consumption
when there is a permanent income shock using savings or credit (see McKenzie (2006)).
For the particular case of Mexico, McKenzie (2006) shows that during the economic crisis
of 1995 there was no evidence of consumption smoothing against the decline of household
income. They show that households reallocated their consumption. Households reduce
consumption on durable goods in order to keep their food consumption at the same level.
Banks et al. (1994) argue that when a family is expecting a child they would tend to
change their preferences and needs and all this could be reflected in their consumption
patterns. The status in the labor market could be another source of changes in
consumption(see Blundell et al. (1994) ). In addition, ? suggest that another drawback
of using consumption data to measure well being is related to changes in real interest
rates where real interest rate could influence their inter-temporal substitution
possibilities. Another disadvantage in using consumption data is that when we
construct a consumption definition, the estimation of the value of durable goods and
housing needs to be imputed The imputations can result in an inaccurate measure of
consumption (see Gradin et al. (2008)).
To sum up, there are pros and cons in using income or consumption data to measure
inequality and poverty. The aims of this research is to compare measures of inequality
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and poverty and analyze if they provide similar information or they complement each
other, regardless of the presence or not of consumption smoothing in Mexico.
2.3.2 Related Literature for Mexico
There is very little literature for Mexico comparing assessments of poverty and
inequality using consumption and income. There is, though, a small literature that uses
data on income and consumption to assess how well households adjust their
consumption after an income shock. For example, Attanasio and Székely (2004) use
consumption and income data to investigate how households adjust their consumption
after shocks to their income. They find that during the 1990s households are not able to
insure idiosyncratic risks either through savings or through other assets. In another
paper, Attanasio and Székely (1998) show that savings are concentrated among
households with high levels of education, while households with low levels of education
have very low savings. This makes them more vulnerable when they have an income
shock. The authors argue that most of the income earners in this group work in the
informal sector. Other authors such as McKenzie (2003) also analyze how households
deal with shocks in income using the same data. They find that during the economic
crisis of 1994, household income and consumption decreased simultaneously, a pattern
inconsistent with consumption smoothing. They found that households changed the
composition of their consumption, reducing health care and allocating more resources to
food.
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2.4 Data and Definitions
2.4.1 Data
I use the National Income and Expenditure Household Survey for Mexico (ENIGH) for
three years 1994, 2002 and 2014. The survey collects detailed data on the structure and
distribution of income and household expenditure on durables and non durables. The
survey is representative at the national level and for rural and urban areas and
considers the household as the unit of observation3.
The reported income refers to the six months prior to the month of interview while
expenditure data is collected via a diary. The 1994 survey was collected between
September and December. The information from 2002 and 2014 was collected between
August and November. The income data and socio-demographic characteristics are
collected via an interview that is taking place for seven days. Expenditure data is
collected with a diary that is left at the house for seven days and is filled by the
household members.
The data on income and expenditure as it is presented by INEGI4 is quarterly. I
transformed into average monthly data.
3https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/enigh/tradicional/2014/.
4Instituto Nacional de Estad́ıstica Geograf́ıa e Informática. Institute of National Statistics, Geography
and Informatics.
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2.4.2 Income and expenditure measures
I construct two consumption definitions. Spending includes expenses on food, clothing
and footwear, housing, cleaning, health, transportation, education and recreation,
personal, transfers to expenditure, auto consumption, in-kind remuneration5 and
in-kind transfers6. Consumption is defined as all items of spending except that on
mortgage interest or of the purchase of vehicles plus the imputed rent for
owner-occupiers, and the consumption flow from vehicles. The estimated rent of the
house is a self-reported variable in the survey. To estimate the flow from vehicles, I
follow the same methodology as Brewer and O’Dea (2012). For each year, I estimate
deciles of the expenditure on non-durables7. Then, I estimate the average expenditure
on vehicles in each decile of non-durable spending and separately according to the
number of cars owned by the household; and I use these averages as the estimated
consumption flow from vehicles.
I construct two measures of income, the first - cash income - includes labor income,
income from own business, transfers, and other income. The second measure of income
is known as ‘broad income’ which is defined as cash income plus the estimated rent of
the house for homeowners less mortgage interest payments and the estimated flow from
vehicles for car owners. The estimated rent of the house and the estimated flow from
5This is an estimation of the value of products or services that workers receive as part of their
compensation.
6in-kind transfers from other households and institutions.
7Nondurables are all the expenses minus expenses on vehicles acquisition, maintenance, rent of the
house and estimated rent of the house
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vehicles are included in the broad definition of income because they can be considered
to generate an additional flow of income.
Finally, income and consumption values are expressed in 2014 pesos, and all
concepts are expressed on a per-capita basis. 8
8I use the same price index for all four measures. Brewer and O’Dea (2012) argue that, if one is
comparing time trends, then different price indices should be used if one is adding implicit consumption
of housing and vehicles to a measure of cash spending or cash income, but we do not do this here. For
that reason, we do not compare explicitly growth in the two income-based measures, or compare growth
in the two consumption-based measures.
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2.5 Results
In what follows, I compare measures of living standards. I compare broad income with
consumption, and cash income with cash spending; the main difference between the two
comparisons is that the first pair of concepts includes the implicit income accruing to
owner occupiers and the consumption flow from vehicles, while the second does not.
2.5.1 Changes in average levels of living standards over time
Figure 2.3 shows that, from 1994 to 2014, average growth in living standards was
positive irrespective of which definition is used. Spending and consumption grew more
than cash income and broad income respectively. The average growth in each
sub-period shows the differences in pattern between 1994 -2002 and 2002 -2014. The
first subperiod (1994 - 2002) reflects the impact of the economic crisis on income,
consumption and spending growth. The average growth of consumption was -1.15
percent, while broad income grew by just 0.19 percent. Cash income grew by 4.82 and
spending grew 3.39 percent. In the second subperiod characterized by economic
recovery, consumption and spending grew more than their income counterparts:
consumption grew by 7.30 percent and broad income by 5.13 percent; spending grew by




Table 2.1 shows summary statistics of inequality for the four definitions, as well as two
standard measures of inequality. On average, cash income, broad income, spending and
consumption inequality increased in 2014 with respect to 2002 and 1994, after a decline
in 2002 due to the economic crisis. However, inequality levels using income and
consumption are different. Inequality levels measured by the Gini index using spending
and consumption are below those using income measures in all three years. Also, the
decline in income inequality between 1994 and 2002 was faster than the decline in
spending and consumption inequality. Between 2002 and 2014, cash income inequality
measured using the Gini increased faster than spending inequality, while consumption
inequality declined slightly in the same period.
The Theil index shows a similar pattern to the Gini index between 1994 and 2002,
all the income and consumption measures declined. Then, from 2002 to 2014 only
income measures increased while spending and consumption declined during the same
period. Income and consumption provide different perspectives of inequality.
Another measure of inequality is the share of total resources going to the bottom
decile, and we show this in Figure 2.4. Consumption and spending shares are always
above income shares. This reflects the lower inequality levels using consumption data
compared with income data. All four income and consumption measures point to an
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increase in the share going to the bottom decile between 1994 and 2002. Nonetheless,
the trends differ between cash income and spending over the second subperiod. There
was a slight reduction in the cash income share going to the bottom decile, while
according to the other three definitions the bottom decile increased its share between
2002 and 2014. Contrasting within income and consumption definitions, the main
difference is between broad income and cash income between 2002 and 2014. The
bottom decile’s share of broad income increased from 1.4 to 1.5 percent between 2002
and 2014. At the same time, cash income remained constant around 1.4 percent. This
result shows that the income flow from housing and vehicles might have contributed to
the increased share going to the bottom decile. However, consumption and spending
definition show very similar trends over the entire period.
Growth Incidence Curves
This section present the results from the Growth Incidence Curves (GIC). The GIC
displays the complete picture of the quantile specific rates of income and consumption
growth. This analysis will let us see the differences in growth between income and
consumption definition across the distribution.
Figure 2.5 shows Growth Incidence Curves (GICs) for 1994-2014. They show that
growth has been stronger at the bottom for both income and consumption. Households
in the bottom half of the distribution experienced positive growth in all four income
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and consumption concepts: broad income, cash income, spending and consumption.
After the 50th percentile, growth becomes negative in the case of consumption and
broad income, while cash income and spending growth remains positive up until the
70th decile. At the very bottom, broad income and consumption grew more than cash
income and spending. Between 1994 and 2014, growth in income, consumption and
spending were inequality decreasing, consistent with the decline in inequality that
started in the mid 2002s.
I next divide the period into two subperiods. Figure 2.6 shows growth rates between
1994 and 2002, a period of economic crisis. They show an inequality-decreasing pattern,
as in the complete period. However, consumption grew less than broad income, and
spending grew less than cash income. The bottom half of the distribution is
characterized by low growth rates in consumption and broad income. At the top, the
four growth rates converge to each other. Generally, households in the top half of the
distribution experienced bigger losses in their living standards compared to households
at the bottom.
Figure 2.7 shows the GICs for the second subperiod starting in 2002 and ending in
2014. During this time, the economy started to recover in the aftermath of the 1994
crisis. Growth rates remain inequality-decreasing, but with different patterns compared
with the previous subperiod. Consumption grew more than broad income for
households in the bottom half. Spending also grew more than cash income up to the 70
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percentile where the two growth rates converge. In this period of recovery, households
increased their consumption compared with the previous subperiod.
The possible role of informality in explaining under-reporting of income
Looking over both periods, then, we can see that, during the economic crisis,
households at the bottom appear to have reduced their consumption and spending.
However, over the second sub-period, they increased their consumption and spending
above increases to their income. This two patterns suggest that households at the
bottom of the distribution smooth consumption given changes in their income.
However, we usually think that consumption smoothing is more common among high
income households than those at the bottom of the distribution. Instead of
consumption smoothing, then, the patterns we see could be due to under-reporting of
income at the bottom of the distribution. Stronger growth in consumption relative to
income suggests that under-reporting of income at the bottom might be significant.
One possible explanations is the increase in informal employment in Mexico.
Households at the bottom employed in the informal sector might enjoy higher levels of
income than those reported to the ENIGH survey and this higher income is reflected in
their consumption levels.
The size of the informal sector has been documented by the Institute of National
Statistics (INEGI) in Mexico. In their latest report dated April 2020 INEGI (2020),
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informal employment9 is estimated to account for 56.2 percent of total employment over
the last quarter of 2019. In 2014 the estimated percentage was 57.8 percent. According
to that report, informal labor is concentrated among people between 15 and 19 years
old and 60 years old and more. The latest International Labor Organization (ILO)
report ILO (2014) suggests that informal employment declines during times of economic
growth and increases in crises. However, after the 2009 crisis, informal employment
remained high in Mexico. This increase in informal employment might have allowed
households at the bottom to increase their consumption over and above increases in
reported income. A similar view is taken by Cortés (2017) who argues that low-income
households have been able to maintain their income level due to the increase in the
informal sector.
9Informal employment is defined as employment in non-agricultural firms that are not legally register
as firms according to the law. The economic unit operates using household resources and does not




Poverty analysis in developing countries such as Mexico tends to use absolute
definitions. Using an absolute approach however is problematic when comparing income
and consumption based definitions of poverty due to the need to define equivalent
poverty thresholds. To avoid this complication, this analysis will use a relative measure.
Given that official measures of poverty identify roughly 20 per cent of the population as
poor, I define the poor as belonging to the bottom quintile of the income or
consumption distributions respectively. This allows for easy identification of the poor in
a comparable way using both income and consumption based measures.
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show the percentage of households that are identified as either
income- or consumption-poor and the percentage of households that are both income-
and consumption-poor. Figure 2.8 shows that in 1994 and 2002 approximately four
percent of the households are only broad income poor but not consumption poor and
around 16 percent are both broad income and consumption poor. The overlap between
households that are income poor and those who are consumption poor is thus
significant but not complete. Between 2002 and 2014 the percentage of households that
are both broad income and consumption poor decreased by 2.3 percent, thus reducing
the overlap between income and consumption based definitions of poverty. Figure 2.9
compares the poverty overlap using the second group of definitions: cash income and
spending. Approximately five percent of households are considered cash income poor
only or spending poor only in 1994 and 2002. In 2014, the overlap between households
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identified as cash income poor and spending poor again declined from 15.46 to 13
percent.
It is not entirely clear what is driving the fall in the overlap of income and
consumption measures of poverty. As I discussed above, one possibility is that income
under-reporting increased, but there is little research on income under-reporting at the
bottom of the distribution in Mexico.
Regardless of the reason, it is clear that there is not a perfect overlap between
households that are income poor and households that are consumption poor. The
following subsections, therefore, compare poverty profiles generated using income and
consumption definitions. I examine correlations between different socio-demographic
characteristics and the probability of being income-poor, consumption-poor or being
poor according to both definitions.
Cash Income and Spending
Previous results show there is not a complete overlap between the income and
consumption definitions of poverty. This is important from a policy perspective as
anti-poverty programs may not be targeted appropriately if only income is used to
identify the poor. To better understand differences between income and consumption
poor households, I run a series of regressions to establish which characteristics most
closely correlate with being only income poor, only consumption poor or both.
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I estimate a multinomial regression model where the dependent variable takes three
values: ”1” for households that are cash income poor but not spending poor, ”2” for
households that are spending poor but not cash income poor and ”3” for households
both cash income poor and spending poor. The base outcome is the value of ”0”
households that are non poor. The predictors are several sociodemographic
characteristics: females household headship, living in a rural area, the number of
members in the house, the education of the household head (secondary education or
less),the age of the household head (60 years or more) and the tenancy status. I then
interpret the characteristics that predict (for example) the category 2 as being those
that are associated with being spending poor but not with being income poor.
Figure 2.10 shows the effect of having a female household headship on the
probability of being cash income or spending poor. In 1994 and 2002, the effect was
negative and very close to zero possibly because in those years the number of female
headed households was small. However, in 2014, the effect of female headship on both
probabilities increased. Households where the head of the household is female are more
likely to be both income poor and consumption poor. This result agrees with the official
poverty report which estimates that 9.6 percent of women were living below the
extreme poverty line in 2014. The gender of the head of the household has impacted the
probability to be income poor and consumption poor in a similar way over time.
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Figure 2.11 shows that living in a rural area has a positive effect on the probability
of being both spending poor and cash income poor, while having little effect on the
probability of being poor according to only one measure. The effect of living in a rural
area on the probability of being both income and consumption poor declined slightly in
2014.
Figure 2.12 shows the effect of the number of people living in the house on the
probability of being poor using income and spending definitions. The effects on both
the probability of being cash income poor and spending poor are positive and have
similar trends in 1994 and 2002. However, in 2014 the effect on the probability of being
spending poor increased while the effect on the probability of being cash income poor
remained at the same level as in 1994 and 2002 and very close to zero. This suggests
that large households may have additional needs that are not well captured by an
income based measure of poverty. Large households may have a larger number of
earners or members receiving income. However, their spending is also likely to be
higher. Therefore their situation appears different when using a consumption based
measure of poverty.
Figure 2.13 shows the effects of the head of the household having at most 12 years or
education on the probability of being cash income poor or spending poor. As expected,
households headed by less educated individuals are more likely to be poor, according to
both income and consumption definitions. Estimated effects are very similar across the
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three years suggesting that the effect of the head’s education has not changed much
over time. This is despite an expansion of education in Mexico between 2000 and 2010
which implies stronger selection effects in 1994 compared to 2014.
Figure 2.14 shows the effects of having a head of household aged 60 or more on the
probability of being cash income poor or spending poor. Comparing the effects on the
probability to be cash income poor and spending poor, the trends are very similar. In
all cases, the effect of having an older head declined. However, households with a head
aged 60 or more are significantly less likely to be income poor but more likely to be
spending poor. This suggest that households headed by an older individual might have
lower consumption relative to their income. This pattern could be showing how
insecurity might be affecting consumption. On the other hand, the income and
spending of elderly households improved as evidenced by the falling effects on the
probability of being poor (both income and consumption). However, the increase in the
informal employment has been concentrated in this age group and younger individuals (
15 to 19 years old).
Finally, Figure 2.15 shows the effect of renting a house on the probability of being
cash income poor or spending poor. Trends in the impact of this variable differ.
Households who were renting were at the same risk of being cash income poor as
home-owners in 1994 and 2002. By 2014 , they were more likely to be poor. However,
their probability of being spending poor declined during the same period.
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The differences in trends between income and consumption definitions shows that
consumption data captures aspects of vulnerability that income alone does not.
Sociodemographic characteristics such as the number of people living in the house and
the effects of living in a house that is being rented show different trends in marginal
effects on income and spending poverty. In 2014, households with many people were
more likely to be spending poor than cash income poor. Renters were more likely to be
spending poor than income poor in 1994, whereas in subsequent years the income
poverty risk increased considerably while the spending poverty risk declined slightly.
The effects of the other socioeconomic variables have similar trends. The effects of
female headship increased both in the case of income and spending poverty. The effect
of the head’s education remained relatively constant. Households headed by an older
individual on the other head experienced a decline of both their income and spending
poverty risk.
Looking across the coefficients it is possible to group the sociodemographic
characteristics into two groups. In the first group the effects of the sociodemographic
variables on the probability of being income or consumption poor increased by 2014.
For the second group, the effects declined or remained the same through the time.
The first group includes female household headship, the number of household
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members and tenancy status. This group shows that despite there are differences
between income and consumption poverty. Consumption data complements the
information that income data provides in terms of poverty.
The second group includes sociodemographic characteristics that have a similar
effect on the probability of being income or consumption poor. The higher probability
of being consumption poor compared to income poor could be explained by the increase
in informal employment that has been concentrated in younger and older groups. The
additional income that informal employment is providing might be boosting
consumption levels but is not properly captured by income data.
To provide some context on these results it is useful to compare them from other
developing countries where similar characteristics are associated with chronic poverty.
McKay and Lawson (2003). The authors present studies with evidence on the positive
correlation between illiteracy and chronic poverty for China and India. In the same line
they present the cases of Peru and Pakistan where the increase in the years of education
reduce the probability of being chronically poor. In addition to that, they show research
with evidence on the increase in the household size and the presence of people from
third generation positively correlated with being chronically poor for Pakistan, rural
China and South Africa. For the location they mention evidence for Uganda, Vietnam,
China where chronic poverty is prevalent in rural areas.
112
My results show that in 1994 four socio-demographic characteristics are more related
with the probability of being consumption poor than income poor: having 60 years of
age or more as the head of the household, living in a house where the family pay a rent
and households living in a rural area and the number of people living in a house. For
2014 the age of the head of the household and the number of people keep identifying
better households that are consumption or spending poor. In addition to that, being the
head of the household with twelve years of education slightly identifies more spending
poor households than those considered income poor. Most of these characteristics are
related with chronic poverty rather than transient poverty according to the literature
(see McKay and Lawson (2003)). Specifically, having 60 years of age or more as the head
of the household, households living in a rural area and the number of people living in a
house and being the head of the household with twelve years of education.
I conclude that poverty definitions based on income and spending provide different
information about households long term living standards. The two definitions
complement each other, providing a fuller picture of the characteristics of households
that can be considered poor than either the income definition alone. If we take into
account the view of long term living standards then the consumption measures may
give have a broader picture of poverty.
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Broad Income and Consumption
The following group of graphs show the effects of the covariates on broad income and
consumption definitions. From Figure 2.17 to Figure 2.21 all the figures show a similar
pattern compare to the effects of the same covariates on cash income and spending
definitions. Therefore, adding the income flow from housing and cars into the cash
income and spending definition does not change the probabilities of being income poor
or consumption poor given the observable characteristics.
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2.6 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper examines trends in poverty and inequality in Mexico using income and
consumption data for three years: 1994, 2002 and 2014. I find that growth in each sub
period shows different patterns. Between 1994 and 2002 cash income and spending grew
by 4.82 and 3.39 percent respectively while broad income and consumption grew only
0.18 and -1.15 percent. Then, in the second sub-period between 2002 and 2014 both
income and consumption displayed positive growth showing a recovery after the
economic crisis. The average growth rates suggest the income flow from housing and
vehicles included in the broad income and consumption definitions was negatively
affected during the economic crisis. On the other hand, cash income and spending
definitions that do not include the income flow from vehicles and housing had positive
average growth rates in both sub-periods.
The analysis of inequality using income and consumption has shown that while the
trends are very similar, the levels differ. Consumption and spending inequality is
generally lower than income inequality. This stylized fact is consistent with the lower
variability of consumption compared to income. Cash income and broad income show a
similar pattern in inequality levels with a drop in 2002, followed by an increase in 2014.
However, consumption and spending measures show a different story. Consumption
inequality declined between 2002 and 2014 while spending inequality increased. Finally,
the share of resources going to the bottom decile declined between 2002 and 20014 in
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the case of income but increased in the case of spending. These results are in line with
the recent debate on the trends in inequality levels. Therefore there is not consistent
evidence that inequality is still declining when looking at different income and
consumption definitions.
Most of the literature for Mexico has focus on correcting the top incomes in order to
get a more real approximation of income inequality. However, consumption data can
correct the estimation at the bottom of the distribution. Therefor income and
consumption can complement the analysis of inequality. Further research needs to be
done in order to compare income and consumption measures at the top.
The GIC analysis shows differences in trends between the two sub-periods. First,
between 1994 and 2002 -a period of economic crisis-, consumption and spending grew
less than broad income and cash income in households in the bottom half of the
distribution. This trend changed in the second sub-period, when the economy recovered.
Between 2002 and 2014, consumption and spending grew more than broad income and
cash income in the bottom half of the distribution. During the economic crisis,
households at the bottom appear to have reduced their consumption and spending.
However, over the second sub-period, they increased their consumption and spending
above increases to their income. Stronger growth in consumption relative to income
suggests that under-reporting of income at the bottom might be significant. One
possible explanation is the increase in the informal employment in Mexico. Households
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at the bottom employed in the informal sector might enjoy higher levels of income than
those reported and this higher income is reflected in their consumption levels.
The poverty analysis shows that the overlap between households that are income
poor and those who are consumption poor is significant but not complete. Between
2002 and 2014 the percentage of households that are both broad income and
consumption poor decreased by 2.3 percent. It is not entirely clear what is driving the
fall in the overlap of income and consumption measures of poverty. As before, one
possibility is that income under-reporting increased for both income definitions.
However, most of the literature so far has concentrated on adjusting the incomes for
those at the top of the distribution.
Finally, I examined correlations between different socio-demographic characteristics
and the probability of being income poor, consumption poor or being poor according to
both definitions. I find that having 60 years old and more as the head of the household and
the increasing number of people living in the house are socio-demographic characteristics
more related with consumption poverty rather than income.
The results show that using consumption and spending to measure inequality and
poverty give a complementary perspective of inequality and poverty. These differences
are important from a policy perspective and combining information from both income
and consumption can provide a more accurate picture of living standards.
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Source: The World Bank Group. World Bank national accounts data.
Figure 2.1: GDP growth (annual percentage)
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Note: The Gini index calculated using per capita income.
Source: Data Socio-Economic Database for Latin American and the Caribean SEDLAC
(CEDLAS and The World Bank) Downloaded from
https://www.cedlas.econo.unlp.edu.ar/wp/en/estadisticas/ December 2020.
Figure 2.2: Income Inequality in Mexico Gini index)
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Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Figure 2.3: Average Growth Rates 1994 - 2014
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Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Figure 2.4: Percentage Share of the Bottom Decile
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Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Figure 2.5: Growth Incidence Curves 1994 - 2014
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Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Figure 2.6: Growth Incidence Curves 1994 - 2002
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Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Figure 2.7: Growth Incidence Curves 2002 - 2014
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Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Figure 2.8: Broad Income vs Consumption
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Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Figure 2.9: Cash Income vs Spending
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Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Figure 2.10: Average Marginal Effects of being Female as the head of the household on
Cash Income and Spending poor Households
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Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Figure 2.11: Average Marginal Effects of Rural on Cash Income and Spending poor
Households
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Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Figure 2.12: Average Marginal Effects of Number of People on Cash Income and
Spending poor Households
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Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Figure 2.13: Average Marginal Effects of the Head of the Household Twelve years of
education on Cash Income and Spending poor Households
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Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Figure 2.14: Average Marginal Effects of Having 60 years of age or more as the Head
of the Household on Cash Income and Spending poor Households
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Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Figure 2.15: Average Marginal Effects of Renting a house rather than being the owner
on Cash Income and Spending poor Households
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Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Figure 2.16: Average Marginal Effects of being Female as the head of the household on
Broad Income and Consumption poor Households
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Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Figure 2.17: Average Marginal Effects of Rural on Broad Income and Consumption
poor Households
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Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Figure 2.18: Average Marginal Effects of Number of People on Broad Income and
Consumption poor Households
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Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Figure 2.19: Average Marginal Effects of the Head of the Household Twelve years of
education on Broad Income and Consumption poor Households
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Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Figure 2.20: Average Marginal Effects of Having 60 years of age or more as the Head
of the Household on Broad Income and Consumption poor Households
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Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Figure 2.21: Average Marginal Effects of Renting a house rather than being the owner




Source: Author’s calculations using Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto (ENIGH)
from Mexico.
Table 2.1: Percentile shares by income and consumption definition
Chapter 3
The Gender Gap in Top Incomes in
the UK, 1997/8 to 2016/7
3.1 Introduction
It is well known now that the share of total income going to the top of the income
distribution has risen sharply over the last three decades in many countries, and especially
the English-speaking countries (see Alvaredo et al. (2018), for example), with the UK
having the second-highest share of income going to the top 1% amongst comparable
developed countries. Within that rising share of top incomes, Atkinson et al. (2018)
shows that, in many countries, the share of top income that is accrued by women is also
rising, but that women remain under-represented in top income groups. They show that,
for example, in 2011 (the most recent year of data used ), the share of women in the top
1% in the UK was 17.8 %, and in the top 0.1%, it was only 9.2%.
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This paper provides new analysis of top income shares in the UK from 1997/8 to
2016/7, making use of a sample of administrative tax records for the UK made available
by HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), and investigates in greater detail than Atkinson
et al. (2018) the reasons for the rise in the female share of top incomes, as well as extending
their analysis with five years’ more data.
The data-set that we use, known as the Public Use Tape (PUT) version of the
Survey of Personal Incomes (SPI)1, is relatively easy for researchers to access. Access to
the full SPI, by contrast, which lies behind some recent work on top income shares in
Advani et al. (2020b) and Advani et al. (2020a), can only be done in a data-lab located
in London, and access has not been possible at all since March 2020 when the
coronavirus pandemic hit the UK. Like us, Atkinson et al. (2018) used the SPI PUT,
but crucially, unlike them, we make full use of the so-called composite cases in order to
uncover the link between incomes at the very top and occupation and gender. As we
explain in Section 3.3.2, these composite cases reflect a form of data aggregation that
HMRC performs on sample records on individuals at the very top of the income
distribution, so as to reduce the risk of identification. The aggregation has a very
limited impact on estimates of top income shares and the female share of top incomes,
but after the aggregation it is not possible to use the PUT micro-data alone to analyse
the distribution of industry sector or region of residence containing those in the highest
income groups. However, HMRC publish supplementary information on the
characteristics of the individuals whose records were aggregated that we exploit so as to
1See HM Revenue and Customs KAI Data, Policy and Coordination (2019) and earlier years.
147
estimate these relationships in full. Specifically, we use decomposition methods to show
the industries within which those on top incomes work, and how this varies between
men and women, and the extent to which this can explain the rising female share of top
incomes.
Our work extends that of Atkinson et al. (2018) by using the composite cases, and
extending it by five more years, from 2011 to 2016. We find that the female share of top
incomes in the UK continued to rise after 2011, although this rise is more evident among
the top 1% than the top 10%. The share of women in the top 10 to 1% group reached 30%
by 2016; among the top 1 to 0.1%, it rose from 13.2% in 1996 to 18.9% in 2016. However,
there has been little change in the female share in the top 0.1% since 1997, although there
are signs of a rising trend in the most recent years. These changes are overwhelmingly
driven by earned income, rather than income from investments. They are accompanied
by changes in the ages of women in top income groups, and their region of residence, with
and increasing concentration of women in the top income groups being aged 45-54, and
an increasing fraction living in London or the South East of England. The decomposition
by industry shows that the rise in the female share of top incomes is overwhelming driven
by increased female shares of income within individual industries. In the top 10 to 1%,
and in the top 1 to 0.1% the industries contributing the most to the rising female share
of income have been “Real estate, renting and business” and “Financial intermediation”,
both of which have seen an increased female of share of income within them, and have
become more important industries as a share of all women with high incomes. As noted,
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the rise in the female income share outside the top 0.1% has slowed slightly since 2009,
particularly between the top 10 to 1%: this is due to a fall in the importance of “Health
and social work” and “Education”, two industries with above-average female income
shares.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the literature
review, Section 3.3 discusses the PUT data and our methods, Section 3.3 presents our
new results on top income shares and female income shares through to 2016, Section
3.4 presents the shift-share analysis exploring the role of within and between industry
changes in explaining the rising female top income shares. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
Our work extends a small literature on gender gaps in top incomes (including Atkinson
et al. (2018), already mentioned). Most of the literature are disproportionately
concentrated in the US, UK and Nordic countries. The reason is that research in this
area depends on having access to high quality data from the top of the distribution. It
is possible to separate the literature into two groups. The first group focuses on the
growing importance of earned income in explaining the growth in top incomes among
women, and the change in gender gaps at the top. The second group explores why
women at the top of the income distribution in some countries still receive more of their
income from unearned sources than do men. In the first group there is evidence for the
US where Guvenen et al. (2020) use administrative data to analyze the dynamics of
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earnings and gender differences among top earners. They find that between the 1980s
and the 2010s women remain underrepresented in the top percentile groups. They show
that the Finance and Insurance industry has increased its relevance among the top
earners. However, in terms of the gender composition there has been little change.
They find that the increase in women representation has nothing to do with their
concentration in high earnings industries like Finance and Insurance. Their
decomposition results show that industry composition does not account for the increase
in women share among the top earnings groups. In the UK, Brewer et al. (2008) was
one of the first to use the SPI PUT to look at the gender split of top incomes in the
UK, but without exploiting the information in the composite cases. More recently,
Burkhauser et al. (2020) decompose the increase of the share of women at the top 1% in
the UK between 1999 and 2015. The authors use the Survey of Personal Incomes (SPI)
and the Family Resources Survey (FRS) to implement a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
for women and men at the top 1% separately. They find that the increase in the time
spent in full-time education accounts for most of the increase in the share of women in
the top 1%.
In the second group of the literature are studies from Nordic countries such as
Boschini et al. (2017). The authors analyze gender differences in top incomes in Sweden
from 1974 to 2013. They find that women’s participation in top incomes has been
increasing, but they are still a minority. They also find that women at the very top
derive their income primarily from capital gains. A similar work for Finland by Terhi
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et al. (2018) analyze the top income distribution from a gender perspective for Finland
between 1995 and 2012. Using administrative data they show that the capital income
share for women is larger than for men among the top one percent. Also, they show
that among the top ten percent of the income distribution the share of women is less
than 30 % and has not been improving during the period of analysis.
Our work is also relevant to the small part of the very large literature on gender
gaps in labour market outcomes that focuses on high earners. For example, Fortin et al.
(2017) ask to what extent the gender pay gap within those on the highest earnings is
driving average pay gaps between men and women, and they look at the UK and other
countries. Yavorsky et al. (2019) focus on the income of the households at the top 1% in
the US between 1995 and 2016. Using the the Survey of Consumer finances the authors
analyze how women’s income contributes to the total household income and the
associated characteristics. They find that there has been no closing of the gender gap
among the top 1%.
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3.3 Data and methods
3.3.1 Data
Public debate and academic research on income inequality in the UK mostly uses the
Households Below Average Income (HBAI) series (a misleading name, as it covers the
whole of the income distribution) (see Department for Work and Pensions (2020)). HBAI
is the name of both a micro-data-set and a report released each year by statisticians in
the Department for Work and Pensions, part of the UK government. The HBAI data-set
in turn is derived from answers to a large, nationally-representative, government-run,
household survey: the Family Resources Survey (FRS).
It has long been suspected that the FRS does not give an accurate impression of the
circumstances of those with very high incomes in the UK. As a result, the HBAI data-
set has, for a number of years, featured a correction to the highest incomes (affecting
less than the richest 2%). However, the nature of the adjustment means that it is not
possible to use the corrected HBAI data to analyse the characteristics of individuals with
the highest incomes because the adjustment imputes the same level of disposable income
to all households that report an income above a certain threshold. And Burkhauser et al.
(2018b) and Burkhauser et al. (2018a) argue that, even after the SPI adjustment, the
HBAI series may be under-estimating the income of those with very high incomes in the
UK.
An alternative to using data from household surveys to study the circumstances of
those with the very highest incomes is to use data from administrative sources on
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incomes declared for tax purposes. This was pioneered by Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel
Saez and the late Anthony Atkinson; their work was first collected together in Atkinson
and Piketty (2007), and is now available at the World Inequality Database (WID) at
https://wid.world). The advantages of using data from tax authorities to learn about
the income of the very rich are that there is lot of data (because everyone has to pay
taxes); data is available for a lot of countries over very long time periods (including
countries and time periods where no estimates are available from household surveys);
the information is usually confirmed against what employers and financial institutions
think to be the case, and there are penalties for getting it wrong. On the other hand,
tax authorities care only about the sort of income that is taxable (and so this will
certainly exclude unrealised capital gains (but see Advani et al. (2020b)), but also
sources of cash income that do not need to be declared because they are not liable to
income tax), and they know about income only if is declared to them. Tax registers
typically contain little information on demographic characteristics, and in countries
with individual-level tax systems like the UK, it is usually not possible to link taxpayers
who are married to each other.
We follow this line of work, using data from the Public Use Tape version of the Survey
of Personal Incomes (HM Revenue and Customs KAI Data, Policy and Coordination
(2019)). The SPI is a stratified random sample of taxpayers (plus some non-taxpayers)
that over-samples those on higher incomes; see HM Revenue and Customs KAI Data,
Policy and Coordination (2017) or Burkhauser et al. (2018b) for more details. Atkinson
(2007) showed how to combine data from the SPI with other information (essentially,
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estimates of the total UK population and of total economy-wide income) to estimate top
income shares, and for a number of years, the SPI, with the corrections implemented by
Atkinson (2007), was used as the source of data on the top income shares held by the
WID (see Alvaredo (2017)). However, the headline series for the top 1% for the UK at
the WID is now based on a DINA approach: see Blanchet et al. (2019).
SPI data is available for most years since 1995, although we do not use 1995 and
1996 for our decomposition. The documentation available for 1995 is not enough to fully
expand the composite with the information on industry. For 1996 the sample is very
small, and there are very few observations of women with very high incomes.2
3.3.2 Further details on processing the Survey of Personal
Incomes and estimating top income shares
The SPI is a stratified random sample of taxpayers (plus some non-taxpayers) that over-
samples those on higher incomes; see HM Revenue and Customs KAI Data, Policy and
Coordination (2017) or Burkhauser et al. (2018b) for more details. To preserve anonymity
amongst those on very high incomes (and particularly when grossing factors fall below 2,
meaning that a very rich individual has a greater than 50% chance of being included in
the sample), HMRC combines the information on certain individuals into what they call
composite cases. The procedure for doing this is described in HM Revenue and Customs
KAI Data, Policy and Coordination (2017). In practice, it means that these individuals
are removed from the sample and replaced with a single composite case that is assigned
2We thank James Browne for useful discussions on this issue.
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the average values of all financial variables, and the total grossing weight of the now-
removed individuals. Information on the categorical variables is set to missing (-1), but
information on the region of residence and the main industry of the individuals behind the
composite case is published in an annex (HMRC always condition on sex and age-band
when constructing composite cases). This procedure, then, does not alter total weighted
income of the sample. We expanded the composite cases in order to have additional
information on the gender, industry and region of very high income groups.
Control totals for 2015-16 and 2016-17
At the time of writing, estimates of top income shares and levels that have been
calculated directly from the SPI were available from the WID up to 2014/15. To
estimate total income for 2015/16, we followed the process in Alvaredo (2017), taking
data from more recent versions of the UK Blue Book. We were not able to replicate
exactly Alvaredo’s values for 2014/5, and so our estimate for future years is obtained by
multiplying Alvaredo’s estimate for 2014/15 by our estimated growth rate in total
income since 2014/15.
Process for dealing with composite cases
In order to expand the composite cases we follow the SPI documentation and replace
replace each composite observation with a number of synthetic individual observations
(as many as were combined into the composite case), and then we assign these synthetic
individuals values of region of residence and industry as specified in the SPI annex. Of
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course, we have no way of knowing what is the joint distribution of region and industry,
and we do not report that in this paper, but we can use these composite cases to look at
how income is related to region and industry.
3.3.3 Methods
Process for estimating top income shares and levels
We estimated all top income shares using the Stata command pshare Jann (2015),
accounting for the grossing weights that are supplied with the SPI.3 Following this
procedure, and using the control totals provided by the WID, we also estimate the top
incomes shares for the years available in the WID. Table 3.1 shows that we are not able
to reproduce exactly the series at WID, but any differences are small; the mean
difference between our estimated top 10% share and that for the WID for the years
1995 to 2015 is 0.096% (not percentage points, so we are out by less than 1 in a 1000);
for the top 1% and top 0.1%, it is 0.229% and 0.417% respectively. Estimates for the
top 0.01% (which are not available at WID) are likely to be subject to small sample
bias (see Jann, 2016 for simulation results on this). When analysing the characteristics
of those in various income centiles, and to work out the levels of income needed to be in
various centiles, we work directly from the discrete distribution of income implied by
the micro-data (rather than, e.g., using the micro-data to estimate a continuous income
distribution function). So we define “the top x%” as the richest N observations where
3pshare allows for the total income to be specified as a parameter, rather than being calculated from
the data. It does not allow one to do the same for the total population, and so we increased the sampling
weights of those in the bottom half of the distribution until the sum of the weights equalled the known
population control total.
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the sum of the weights for the first N observations was strictly less than x% of the
population (as given by the control totals), and the sum of the weights of the first N+1
observations was greater than or equal to x% of the population.4.
Inference
Estimated standard errors for income shares were produced by the Stata command
pshare (Jann, 2016). The sample size of the SPI has increased over time, and this
explains the general fall over time in the size of the estimated standard errors seen in
Figure 3.1. Estimated standard errors for the fraction of income that is earned, were
computed using a bootstrap method. The SPI is a stratified sample with widely-varying
sampling probabilities, but the Public Use Tape does not contain information that
would allow researchers to identify the separate strata. As an approximation, we placed
all observations with the same value of FACT, the grossing weight, into the same
pseudo-strata. For each year, we then drew 999 stratified bootstrap samples using these
pseudo-strata. The drawback to this method is that, for some years of the SPI, the
grossing variable FACT can take some unusual values. In 2004/5, for example, there are
596 unique values of FACT, and so we have 596 pseudo-strata, 10.9% of which have 1
observation, and 23.1% of which have 10 or fewer observations (the 1-observation-strata
account for 0.03% of the weighted population, and the strata with 10 or fewer
4The SPI comes with a set of grossing factors (FACT) which can be thought of as how many individuals
in the UK are represented by the single entry in the micro data-set. No information is given on how
these are calculated, but we assume they are akin to the inverse of the probability each individual had
of being sampled. What is slightly unusual is that these grossing factors are not integers. Rounding or
truncating these weights so that they become integers did not seem appropriate, and so we worked with
non-integer weights throughout.
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observations contain 0.12% of the weighted population (unweighted, these are 0.01%
and 0.08%)).
3.3.4 Shift-share
This section describes the shift-share analysis that we use to decompose the change in
the female income share into a term reflecting the change in the income share of each
industry, and a term reflecting changes in gender participation within industry. Let’s
denote by TIft the total income share of women at time t. Using a standard shift-share








where TIjt is the total income share in sector j, TIfjt denotes the total income share
of women in sector j, and αfj = (TIfjt + TIfjt−1)/2 and αj = (ITjt + ITjt−1)/2 are
decomposition weights. The first term in equation (1) represents the change in female
income share that is attributable to changes in the industry structure of the economy
(between-industry component), while the second term reflects changes in the female
income participation within each industry. This will account for the changes in incomes
for women and how the changes in industry have contributed.
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3.4 Results: top income trends
3.4.1 Recent Trends in Top Incomes
Figure 3.1 shows the new estimates of top income shares, including new estimates for
2015/16 and 2016/17. The share of pre-tax income that goes to the richest 1% of adults
was at its lowest level in 1978, at slightly under 6%. Like the Gini coefficient, this measure
of inequality rose through the 1980s, but it then continued to rise through the 1990s and
the 2000s: in fact, the share of income going to the top 1% grew by more between 1990
and 2009 than it did in the 1980s. The share of income going to the top 0.1% went
up by a half between 1996 and 2009, to reach 6.5%, or 65 times as much as in a world
where income was shared equally (and the richest 0.01% of adults in 2016/17 had just
over 2.0% of income, or 200 times as much as they would have if all income was shared
equally). Top income shares have rise so much over time, in 2009 (the least-equal year
on record, according to this data) the richest 0.1 % had a larger share of national income
than did the richest 1% in 1979 (the most-equal year). Top income shares did fall back
considerably in 2009, after the financial crisis. The estimates since 2010 are missing for a
couple of years, but by 2016/17, the share of income going to the top 0.1% was of 5.46%
among the highest (after 2009/10), and the top 1% share was 13.8%).5
Figure 3.2 shows what fraction of top incomes are from earned income (as opposed to
5As a measure of inequality, these top income shares are telling a different story from the usual
statistics that are based on household-level disposable income derived from surveys, where the Gini
coefficient and the 90:10 have hardly changed since the early 1990s, and are lower now than immediately
before the financial crisis (see Cribb et al., 2018; DWP, 2019). It is beyond the scope of this paper
to explore these differences thoroughly: they could be due, for example, in differences between the
distribution of before- and after- tax income; differences in individual- and household-level income, or
differences in the accuracy of the income measures.
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income from financial investments). In 2016/17, the vast majority of income in the top
10 to 1%, and even in the top 1 to 0.1%, is from earned income. Within the top 0.1 %
income from financial assets come less than 20% of total income.
3.4.2 Gender Composition and Income Shares of Top Incomes
Figure 3.3 shows the fraction of adults in various top income groups who are female,
beginning in 1996. It is clear that women are under-represented, especially at the very
top of the income distribution, but that the female share is rising over time. The share
of women between the top 10 to 1 % increased by around 8 percentage points between
1996 and 2016 to reach 30%. Among the top 1 to 0.1 %, the female share is lower, rising
from 13.2% in 1996 to 18.9% in 2016. However, there has been little change in the female
share in the top 0.1% (in the richest 0.05 percent, for example, the share in 1996/97 and
2016/17 was broadly the same, at around 11%), although there are signs of a rising trend
in the most recent years.
Figure 3.4 show that women’s income share has risen specially among the top
income groups between the 10 to 0.1 percent. For the very top income groups between
the 0.1 to 0.05 percent the trend is not clear. Between 2012 and 2015 it seems that the
share increased by 4.4 percentage points. However by 2016 it dropped 0.4%.
Figures 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 present the earned income by gender among the top 10 to 1
percent, 1 to 0.1 percent and the 0.1 percent. Between the top 10 to 1 in Figure 3.5 is
clear that the earned income share for women is smaller than the one for men. On
average the differences was of 4.8% during the period. However, the difference has been
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declining. In 1996 the earned income share for women was 89% while for men 95%, by
2016 the earned income share dropped to 86 percent approximately while for men was
89%. The difference was reduced by 1.3 percentage points. For the income group
between the 1 to 0.1%, the earned income share for both men and women is smaller
than the previous income group as it is shown in Figure 3.6. The earned income share
for women is on average 78% and for men 88% for the complete period. Nonetheless,
the difference in the shares between men and women is bigger than in the previous
income group. On average the difference is 10%. However, it has been declining: in
1996 the difference in share between men and women was 18% and by 2016 it was 6%.
The last income group of those in the top 0.1 percent the earned income share it is even
smaller than in the previous two income groups for both men and women. As it is
shown in Figure 3.7 the earned income share for women is on average 69% while for
men is 82% for the complete period. The differences in the earned income share are
wider than in the previous income groups: on average the difference is 13%. The earned
income share for women is lower than that of men among this income group, and lower
than that of other income groups. It seem that the differences in shares have been
declining but not as fast as in the top 10 to 1% group. In 1996 the earned income share
for women was 58% and by 2016 was 78%. This increase it is not observed in the
previous income groups.
In all income groups, then, women have a smaller share of earned income than men.
But the difference has been declining over the period in question. For women in the top
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1 percent, the fraction of income that is earned is higher now than it was in 1996, but
the opposite is true for those outside the top 1 %.
Overall then, the fraction of women at the top of the UK income distribution has been
rising, except at the very top, and has been caused by a rise in the number of women
with high levels of earnings, rather than investment, income. In the top 10 to 1 %, the
rise in the female share slowed down after the late 2000s; in the top 1 %, the share has
continued to rise even in the most recent years.
3.4.3 Industry Composition of Top Incomes
The SPI data classifies every adult with the industry from which they earn most of their
income, and the industry shares are shown in Table 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6.
Table 3.3 shows that, within the top 10 to 1 %, there was a fall in the share between
1997 and 2016 in those who work in “Manufacturing”, “Public administration” and
“Education” by 8.1, 3.8 and 2.7 percentage points respectively. At the same time there
were increases in the shares in “Real estate, renting and business”, “Financial
intermediation” and “Health and social work” of 8.5, 1.6 and 1.7 percentage points.
Table 3.4 shows a very similar pattern for the top 1 to 0.1 %: a decline in
“Manufacturing” and “Wholesale and retail”, and an increase in “Financial
intermediation” and “Real estate, renting and business” (note that over half of those in
the top 1 to 0.1 % are concentrated in those two industries in 2016). For the top 0.1 %,
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 confirm that the main changes were a rise in “Financial
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intermediation” and in “Manufacturing”. The rise in the share of the Financial
intermediation industry has been documented by Guvenen et al. (2020) for the US.
They show that by 2012 one-third of the workers in the top 0.1 % were in the finance
and insurance industry, while in the 1980’s the health care industry accounted for the
largest share.
3.4.4 Distribution of women by age groups
Figures 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 show the percentage share of women in different age bands.
Within the top 10 to 1% (Figure 3.8) and the top 1 to 0.1% (Figure 3.9) we can see
that the proportion of women between the age 45 and 54 has been increasing and at the
same time younger women between 25 to 34 years old has been declining. Among
women in the top 1 to 0.1 this is more evident: in 1997 women between 45 to 54 years
old represented around 28%, but 2016 their share was up to 35% while women between
the ages 25 to 34 had a fall in their share by seven percentage points between 1997 and
2016. In the top 0.01%, this pattern is even more pronounced: women between the ages
45 and 54 years old represent approximately 44% in 2016, while back in 1997 their
proportion was 27%.
3.4.5 Regional distribution of women in the top 1%
Table 3.2 shows the regional distribution of women in the top 1%. More than fifty
percent of the women form the top one percent are concentrated in London and South
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East and this concentration has increased over time. In 1997 London concentrated 31%
of the women and the South East around 20%. By 2016 the percentage of women in
London increased by 8.5 percentage points while in South East 0.23 percentage points.
Women from top income groups are concentrated not only in specific industries such
as Financial intermediation but also in two specific regions: London and South East.This
concentration has increased over the years. In addition to that, we show that women
in the top income groups are between 45 and 54 years old and that their proportion
has been increasing at expenses of younger women. Despite the fact that women share
has increased they are still under-represented at the very top. The next section will
show the results form the shift and share decomposition to find out the contribution
the contribution of specific industries to the increase in the women share among the top
income groups.
3.5 Results of the shift-share decomposition
Here we present the results from the decomposition. First, we present the overall
decomposition results, and then we discuss what the shift-share says about the
importance of particular industries.
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3.5.1 Overall results of the decomposition
This subsection shows the results from the general decomposition in Tables 3.7 to 3.10.
All tables shows the female share of total income in the initial year and the final year
(as plotted in Figure 3.4), and then show the contribution of the changing female share
of income within individual industries, and the contribution of the changing importance
of different industries, according to the formula in Section 3.3.4. The decomposition is
carried out over the period from 1997 to 2016, and then split into the sub-periods before
and after 2009; this choice of year is partly governed by the change in the way that
industry is defined in the underlying data in 2009, but also corresponds to the period
before and after the financial crisis (SPI data is not available for 2008). Figure 3.11, 3.12
and 3.13 show the key results graphically.
As was clear from Figure 3.4, the female share of income changed much more between
1997 and 2009 than between 2009 and 2016 for the top 10 to 1% (rising by 6.4 percentage
points out of the total change of 7.3 percentage points). For the top 1 to 0.1% and top
0.05 per cent, the majority of the change happened in the first period (3.1 out of 5.1
percentage points, and 1.7 out of 2.9 percentage points). For the top 0.1 to 0.05%, the
female share fell in the first period and rose in the second period.
For the four income groups, and for all time periods, we always observe that the
within-industry effect is considerably bigger than the changing industry shares, and that
the within-industry effect always takes the same sign as the overall change in the female
share of income. In detail, among the top 0.1 to 0.05% and among the top 0.05 %, the
effect of changing industry shares has been negative for the complete period (see Figure
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3.11) and the subperiod 1997-2009 (see Figure 3.12). For the 2009-2016 subperiod, Figure
3.13 shows that the changing industry share contribution was positive only for the top
0.1 to 0.05%. On the other hand, Figure 3.12 shows that most of the increase in female
income share happened before 2009. For the 2009-2016 period, the growth in the female
income share was driven by the contribution of the within-industry change, while the
industry share contribution had a negative effect on the overall increase in the income
share, except for the Top 0.1 to 0.05% income group (see Figure 3.13).
Because the industry classifications changed in 2009, the results for the full period
might be affected by our mapping from the post-2009 classification to the pre-2009
classification. Tables 3.9 and 3.10 show that this makes no difference to the overall
decomposition results over the 2009-2016 period, at least to the level of accuracy shown
here.
3.5.2 Contribution of different industries
Tables 3.11 to 3.16 show the detailed decomposition results, over the whole period and
the two sub-periods, but only for the top 10 to 1% and the top 1 to 0.1% groups (small
sample sizes in individual industries make some of the results for the top 0.1% somewhat
erratic).
Over the whole period, the rising female share of income in the top 10 to 1% group
was due to rising female share of income in individual industries. This was particularly
marked in “Public administration” (from 17.8 to 30.9%), “Education” (from 40.7 to
51.1%), “Other services” (from 24.2 to 33.4%) and “Financial intermediation” (23.7 to
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32.6%), but the decomposition identifies the rising female shares in “Real estate, renting
and business” (21.0 to 29.3%) and “Manufacturing” (8.3 to 14.1%) as being the two
more important industries, given those industries’ greater share of top incomes in 1997.
The biggest changes in industry shares over the whole period were the rise in the
importance of “Real estate, renting and business” and a decline in “Manufacturing”.
Combining those two factors, the industries identified by the shift-share as explaining
the most of the overall change over the period were “Real estate, renting and business”
,“Health and Social Work” and “Financial intermediation”.
In the top 1 to 0.1%, there were large increases in the female share of income
between 1997 and 2016 in “Public administration” (10.3 to 22.6%), “Health and social
work” (11.9 to 24.6%), “Hotels and restaurants” (14.4 to 23.5%) and “Utilities” (7.8 to
15.0%), but the decomposition identifies the rising female shares in “Real estate, renting
and business” (12.3 to 19.4%) and “Financial intermediation” (10.9 to 17.4%) as being
the two more important industries, given those industries’ greater share of top incomes
in 1997. The biggest changes in industry shares over the whole period were the rise in
the importance of “Financial intermediation” and “Real estate, renting and business”
and a decline in “Manufacturing” and “Wholesale and retail”. Combining those two
factors, the industries identified by the shift-share as explaining the most of the overall
change over the period were “Financial intermediation” and “Real estate, renting and
business”.
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For both top income groups, the 1997-2009 period saw the most change in the
overall female share of income. In the first sub-period, this was driven by “Real estate,
renting and business” and “Health and social work” in the top 10 to 1% group, and
“Financial intermediation” and “Health and social work” in the top percent. In the
more recent 2009-2016 period, the small rise in female share of income in the top 10 to
1% group was driven by “Real estate, renting and business”, which became more
important and more female-dominated, but this was almost entirely offset by a negative
contribution from “Education”, reflecting its declining importance over this period and
the fact that the female income share is greater than a half in this income bracket. The
rise in female share of income in the top 1 to 0.1%t group in the 2009-2016 period was
due to “Real estate, renting and business” and “Financial intermediation”, with an
offsetting downward pressure from “Health and social work”, which declined in
importance and has a relatively high female share of income.
Our results show that administrative data contains very rich information that help
to characterize gender gap trends in a more accurate way comparing with survey data.
This characterization based on a fully expanded administrative data could be
potentially combined with survey data. Burkhauser et al. (2020) use both
administrative data from SPI and survey data from Family Resources Survey to get
additional sociodemographic characteristics from the top 1% and implement a
regression-based decomposition. However, they did not use a fully expanded version of
the SPI as we did in this paper because their aim was basically exploring in detail the
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additional information that survey data can provide for top income groups. Our goal
was different: we concentrate on getting the most detailed information that
administrative data can provide. Potentially, administrative and survey data could be
matched statistically to examine other dimensions of gender inequality at the top of the
income distribution. However, this goes beyond the scope of our paper and can be set
as a future research.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper has contributed to the literature on the gender gaps in top incomes, analysing
a publicly-available sample of administrative data from the UK, but having taken steps
to (safely) undo some of the anonymisation that is performed to data on the highest
income individuals.
We show that women are under-represented at the top of the UK income distribution,
but that this under-representation has been falling over the past two decades in the top
10 to 0.1%, and within the last decade within the top 0.1%. The rising share of women
in top income groups is driven by women with earned income and accompanied by an
increasing share of top income women being aged 45-54 and living in London or the South
East of England. The decomposition by industry, which would not be possible without
our undoing of some of the anonymisation, shows that the rise in the female share of top
incomes is overwhelming driven by increased female shares of income within industries.
In the top 10 to 1%, and in the top 1 to 0.1%, the industries contributing the most to the
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rising female share of income have been “Real estate, renting and business” and “Financial
intermediation”, both of which have seen an increased female of share of income within
them, and have become more important industries as a share of all women with high
incomes. The rise in the female income share outside the top 0.1% has slowed slightly
since 2009, particularly at lower top incomes: this is due to a fall in the importance
of “Health and social work” and “Education”, two industries with above-average female
income shares.
We have also provided new estimates of top income shares for years not yet covered
by the WID, and we have shown how, although full sampling and stratification details
are not provided by the data owners, a bootstrap can be used to estimate confidence
intervals around key statistics.
All in all we show that under-representation of women among top income groups
in the UK has been falling. However, specific industries and regions have concentrate
the improvements. Therefore, it remains necessary to implement specific policies to
help to reduce the concentration in “Real estate, renting and business” and “Financial
intermediation” industries. In this way, women from all the industries can have the
same opportunities to increase their income and reduce the gender gap. Additionally, the
concentration in London and the South East of England impose geographic barriers for
those women living in different areas. More ambitious policies across regions need to be
implemented in order to make other regions economically attractive for women. Policies
that address geographical imbalances and the large dependence on the financial sector
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would benefit women income across the distribution not just women from the top income
groups.
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Source: SPI: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.
Figure 3.1: Top Income Shares in the UK 1996/7 to 2016/7
176
Source: SPI: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.
Figure 3.2: Fraction of top incomes in the UK that is earned, 1996/7 to 2016/7
177
Source: SPI: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.
Figure 3.3: Share of women in top income groups in the UK, 1996/7 to 2016/7
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Source: SPI: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.
Figure 3.4: Women’s share of total income by top income groups in the UK, 1996/7 to
2016/7
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Source: SPI: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.
Figure 3.5: Earned income share for men and women in the top 10 to 1% in the UK,
1996/7 to 2016/7
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Source: SPI: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.
Figure 3.6: Earned income share for men and women in the top 1 to 0.1% in the UK,
1996/7 to 2016/7
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Source: SPI: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.
Figure 3.7: Earned income share for men and women in the top 0.1% in the UK, 1996/7
to 2016/7
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Source: SPI: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.
Figure 3.8: Share of women by group of age in the top 10 to 1% in the UK, 1997/8 to
2016/7
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Source: SPI: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.
Figure 3.9: Share of women by group of age in the top 1 to 0.1% in the UK, 1997/8 to
2016/7
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Source: SPI: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.
Figure 3.10: Share of women by group of age in the top 0.1% in the UK, 1997/8 to
2016/7
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Source: SPI: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.
Figure 3.11: Shift-share results, 1997 - 2016
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Source: SPI: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.
Figure 3.12: Shift-share results, 1997 - 2009
187
Source: SPI: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.




year Top 10% Top 1% Top 0.1% Top 0.01%
SPI WID SPI WID SPI WID SPI
1996 0.39296 0.39300 0.11902 0.11901 0.04125 0.04130 0.01355
1997 0.38940 0.38940 0.12074 0.12071 0.04149 0.04150 0.01343
1998 0.39516 0.39470 0.12558 0.12530 0.04451 0.04440 0.01586
1999 0.41308 0.41329 0.13265 0.13239 0.04809 0.04795 0.01707
2000 0.40992 0.40984 0.13514 0.13508 0.04943 0.04936 0.01645
2001 0.41465 0.41411 0.13403 0.13386 0.04753 0.04753 0.01540
2002 0.41029 0.41011 0.13016 0.13027 0.04469 0.04487 0.01410
2003 0.41376 0.41404 0.13286 0.13239 0.04636 0.04571 0.01544
2004 0.40896 0.40828 0.13339 0.13300 0.04730 0.04711 0.01599
2005 0.41640 0.41609 0.14262 0.14224 0.05196 0.05177 0.01756
2006 0.42080 0.41990 0.14916 0.14820 0.05607 0.05548 0.01960
2007 0.42672 0.42615 0.15511 0.15440 0.06076 0.06050 0.02255
2009 0.41578 0.41528 0.15469 0.15420 0.06503 0.06460 0.02505
2010 0.38118 0.38083 0.12605 0.12550 0.04716 0.04660 0.01693
2013 0.41198 0.41290 0.14528 0.14530 0.05846 0.05841 0.02271
2014 0.39935 0.39990 0.13923 0.13880 0.05472 0.05480 0.02064
2015 0.40875 0.14883 0.06177 0.02416
2016 0.39469 0.13765 0.05456 0.02072
Source: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.
Table 3.1: Top income shares in the UK a comparison of our estimates vs those at the
World Inequality Database
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Region 1997 2000 2009 2013 2016
North East 1.41 1.02 1.35 1.11 0.89
North West 6.15 6.63 5.80 5.34 5.19
Yorkshire and Humberside 4.51 3.53 4.21 4.01 3.38
East Midlands 4.78 4.26 4.19 4.21 3.72
West Midlands 4.22 4.29 4.73 4.25 4.02
Eastern 11.89 10.88 10.03 9.91 9.99
London 31.17 36.74 35.28 36.48 39.72
South East 19.87 20.24 19.19 19.56 20.10
South West 8.20 6.34 5.19 5.55 5.38
Wales 1.75 1.42 1.95 1.71 1.49
Scotland 4.71 3.55 5.34 5.09 4.47
Northern Ireland 0.84 0.95 1.30 1.12 1.15
Other/abroad 0.52 0.16 1.46 0.00 0.49
Unknown 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.01
Source: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.
Table 3.2: Share of women by Region from the top 1 %
191
Industry 1997 2000 2009 2013 2016
Agriculture 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.004
Mining 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.006
Manufacturing 0.168 0.148 0.083 0.089 0.086
Utilities 0.011 0.010 0.013 0.014 0.015
Construction 0.047 0.058 0.057 0.050 0.056
Wholesale and retail 0.092 0.093 0.079 0.081 0.083
Hotels and restaurants 0.010 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.010
Transport, storage and comms 0.056 0.050 0.050 0.056 0.058
Financial intermediation 0.061 0.068 0.074 0.074 0.077
Real estate, renting & business 0.163 0.197 0.210 0.229 0.248
Public administration 0.072 0.050 0.049 0.040 0.033
Education 0.085 0.064 0.083 0.073 0.058
Health and social work 0.055 0.050 0.078 0.077 0.072
Other services 0.025 0.029 0.021 0.020 0.021
Other 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.007
Not in work 0.126 0.118 0.164 0.143 0.139
Claimants 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
International organisations 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Unknown 0.000
Missing 0.008 0.038 0.015 0.026 0.027
Source: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.
Table 3.3: Industry shares of total income, top 10-1%
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Industry 1997 2000 2009 2013 2016
Agriculture 0.016 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004
Mining 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.010 0.007
Manufacturing 0.105 0.093 0.053 0.052 0.048
Utilities 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.004
Construction 0.027 0.034 0.034 0.027 0.030
Wholesale and retail 0.117 0.093 0.079 0.078 0.076
Hotels and restaurants 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.008
Transport, storage and comms 0.036 0.031 0.032 0.034 0.038
Financial intermediation 0.128 0.144 0.181 0.191 0.204
Real estate, renting & business 0.273 0.283 0.259 0.276 0.302
Public administration 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.006 0.005
Education 0.012 0.012 0.016 0.014 0.011
Health and social work 0.072 0.069 0.101 0.085 0.066
Other services 0.025 0.026 0.019 0.018 0.019
Other 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.009
Not in work 0.137 0.128 0.148 0.147 0.137
Claimants 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
International organisations 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Unknown 0.000
Missing 0.013 0.051 0.034 0.034 0.031
Source: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.
Table 3.4: Industry shares of total income, top 1-0.1%
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Industry 1997 2000 2009 2013 2016
Agriculture 0.013 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.006
Mining 0.005 0.004 0.010 0.005 0.005
Manufacturing 0.085 0.057 0.036 0.043 0.032
Utilities 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.003
Construction 0.030 0.021 0.049 0.022 0.018
Wholesale and retail 0.087 0.066 0.071 0.067 0.051
Hotels and restaurants 0.021 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.009
Transport, storage and comms 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.022 0.026
Financial intermediation 0.190 0.280 0.269 0.308 0.317
Real estate, renting & business 0.298 0.328 0.286 0.304 0.332
Public administration 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
Education 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.001
Health and social work 0.035 0.024 0.020 0.012 0.013
Other services 0.024 0.026 0.024 0.025 0.023
Other 0.008 0.004 0.007 0.011 0.011
Not in work 0.146 0.117 0.127 0.114 0.108
Claimants 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
International organisations 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Unknown 0.000
Missing 0.036 0.035 0.054 0.045 0.042
Source: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.
Table 3.5: Industry shares of total income, top 0.1-0.05%
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Industry 1997 2000 2009 2013 2016
Agriculture 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.009
Mining 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.002
Manufacturing 0.123 0.060 0.037 0.024 0.022
Utilities 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.002
Construction 0.017 0.012 0.034 0.023 0.025
Wholesale and retail 0.069 0.053 0.077 0.062 0.042
Hotels and restaurants 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.006
Transport, storage and comms 0.018 0.018 0.020 0.017 0.021
Financial intermediation 0.222 0.321 0.297 0.343 0.353
Real estate, renting & business 0.230 0.257 0.228 0.260 0.263
Public administration 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001
Education 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.004
Health and social work 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.004
Other services 0.056 0.051 0.044 0.051 0.059
Other 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.011 0.016
Not in work 0.173 0.128 0.132 0.121 0.113
Claimants 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
International organisations 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Unknown 0.000
Missing 0.048 0.050 0.075 0.064 0.060
Source: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.



















Top 10 to 1 % 0.215 0.289 0.073 0.064 0.009
Top 1 to 0.1 % 0.138 0.189 0.051 0.051 0.000
Top 0.1 to 0.05% 0.122 0.131 0.009 0.018 -0.008
Top 0.05% 0.077 0.106 0.029 0.036 -0.006
Source: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.




















Top 10 to 1 % 0.215 0.279 0.064 0.047 0.017
Top 1 to 0.1 % 0.138 0.169 0.031 0.028 0.003
Top 0.1 to 0.05% 0.122 0.109 -0.012 -0.007 -0.006
Top 0.05% 0.077 0.094 0.017 0.017 0.000
Source: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.




















Top 10 to 1 % 0.279 0.289 0.009 0.017 -0.008
Top 1 to 0.1 % 0.169 0.189 0.021 0.023 -0.002
Top 0.1 to 0.05% 0.109 0.131 0.022 0.020 0.001
Top 0.05% 0.094 0.106 0.012 0.015 -0.003
Source: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.




















Top 10 to 1 % 0.279 0.289 0.009 0.017 -0.008
Top 1 to 0.1 % 0.169 0.189 0.021 0.023 -0.003
Top 0.1 to 0.05% 0.109 0.131 0.022 0.020 0.002
Top 0.05% 0.094 0.106 0.012 0.015 -0.003
Source: authors’ calculations using the SPI and the methods described in Section 3.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































There has been an increasing interest among policy makers and academics in inequality
trends and poverty around the world. However, there is not yet conclusive evidence on
their determinants, so as to allow policy makers to designs the best policies to reduce
inequality and poverty levels. Motivated by the puzzling situation in Latin America where
high levels of inequality and poverty are persistent but their trends over the last years
have been declining, the first two chapters of this thesis focus on the impact of education
on the declining trends of inequality in the region and a comparison of different measures
of poverty and inequality in Mexico using income and consumption data. Finally, the
third Chapter focuses on the gender gap in the United Kingdom among top income
groups. The concentration of income during the last years has been a hot topic, however
very little is known about the income differences between men an women in high income
groups.
In the first Chapter of this thesis, I used survey data from 18 countries in Latin
America for the period between 2000 and 2010. Employing the novel decomposition
method based on RIF regressions, I found that the expansion of education increases
inequality in most of the countries. However, if we take into account the changes in
202
203
returns to education, it reduces inequality in most countries. Returns to education fell
between 2000 and 2010 across the region and are the main component of the effects of
educational expansion on inequality. As a result, policies aiming to expand education
need to consider their effects on inequality. In order to do that, governments need to
analyse the shape of the returns to education to estimate the additional effects on
inequality that could undermine the positive effects of the educational expansion for
those at the bottom of the income distribution.
In the second Chapter of this thesis, I examine and contrast poverty and inequality
measures using income and consumption data from Mexico between 1994 and 2014.
Using data from Household Income and Expenditure Surveys, I found that growth was
pro-poor, whether income or consumption are used to calculate inequality. Both
definitions follow each other very closely, and during the period of economic crisis
(1994-2002) consumption grew less than income. However, during the period of recovery
(2002-2014), consumption grew more than income. The poverty analysis shows that
households identified as income poor and consumption poor do not completely overlap
and the overlap decreased by 2014. These results suggest there might be
under-reporting at the bottom of the income distribution and one possible explanation
is the increase in informal employment. Finally, I argue that consumption definitions of
inequality and poverty are complements of income based definitions rather than
substitutes. The complementary between income and consumption data might help
policy makers to form a more complete picture of poverty and the characteristics of the
204
poor.
Finally, in the third Chapter, we analyzed the changes in the gender structure at the
top of the income distribution in the United Kingdom over the last 20 years using the
Survey of Personal Incomes. We show that women are under-represented at the top of
the income distribution, but this under-representation has been falling over the past two
decades. The rising share of women in the top income groups is driven by women with
earned income and accompanied by an increasing share of top income women being aged
45-54 and living in London at the South East of England. The industries contributing the
most to the rising female share of income have been “Real estate, renting and business”
and “Financial intermediation” both of which have seen an increased female share of
income within them, and have become more important industries as a share of all women
with high incomes. The rise in the female income share outside the top 0.1 percent has
slowed slightly since 2009, particularly at the lower top incomes: this is due to the fall in
the importance of “Health and social work” and “Education”, two industries with above-
average female income share. We conclude that the reduction in the gender gap among
top income groups is not a generalized phenomena across the country and industries.
It remains necessary to implement policies that spread better opportunities to women
across the industries and country.
